Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-47140
NodeVM builtin denylist bypass via process and inspector/promises allows host code execution
- Class
- AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Sandbox escape
- Affected
- vm2 (npm)
- Gets past
- Sandbox or allowlist
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- 1.0% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
Sandboxed code loads process or inspector/promises, which were missing from the builtin denylist, to reach child_process or host-side evaluation. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Summary
NodeVM blocks several dangerous Node.js builtins such as module, worker_threads, cluster, vm, repl, and inspector.
However, the denylist misses process and inspector/promises. Both can be used from sandboxed code to reach host-side execution primitives.
This allows sandboxed code to bypass the intended builtin restrictions and execute code in the host process.
Details
The dangerous builtin denylist is defined in lib/builtin.js. This list does not include:
process
inspector/promises
Non-denied builtins are exposed to the sandbox through:
builtins.set(key, special ? special : vm => vm.readonly(hostRequire(key)));
Because of this, sandboxed code can bypass the expected restrictions in two ways:
require('process').getBuiltinModule('child_process')reloadschild_process, even whenchild_processis excluded.require('inspector/promises')exposes the Inspector protocol and can callRuntime.evaluatein the host process.
PoC
Tested on:
vm2: 3.11.2
Node.js: v25.9.0
Run from the vm2 repository root:
node poc/dangerous-builtin-denylist-rce.js
dangerous-builtin-denylist-rce.js
The PoC first confirms the intended restrictions work:
require("inspector"): BLOCKED
require("child_process"): BLOCKED
Then it bypasses them:
require("process").getBuiltinModule("child_process").execFileSync(...)
This spawns a host child process. It also confirms:
require("inspector/promises").Session().post("Runtime.evaluate", ...)
This evaluates JavaScript in the host process.
<img width="858" height="766" alt="Screenshot 2026-05-10 at 11 53 33 AM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7614aecb-5ffd-4c41-bfe8-e1fcb3b1bb59" />
Impact
An attacker who can run untrusted JavaScript inside NodeVM with affected builtin settings can escape the sandbox and execute arbitrary code in the host process.
This can lead to full compromise of the application process, including reading files, writing files, spawning processes, and accessing host environment secrets.
(This is not reachable with the default NodeVM configuration where require is disabled or no affected builtins are allowed. It affects applications that allow process, inspector/promises, or the wildcard "*" in require.builtin.)
Suggested fix
Add process and inspector/promises to the dangerous builtin blocklist.
Also consider blocking dangerous builtin families by prefix, for example blocking both:
inspector
inspector/*
instead of only exact module names.
References
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-rp36-8xq3-r6c4
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47140
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/a1ed47a98d1cc36cb48c0d566d55889688e0b59b
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.4
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.