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Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-44563

Open WebUI's Ollama Model Access Control Bypass via /api/generate, /api/embed, /api/embeddings, and /api/show

CVE-2026-44563 · 2026-05-08 moderate

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the source)
Technique
Authentication and access control
Affected
open-webui (PyPI)
Gets past
Authorisation check
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

Ollama proxy routes forward any model name after only a login check, skipping the model access grant enforced on the chat route. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Ollama Model Access Control Bypass via /api/generate, /api/embed, /api/embeddings, and /api/show

Affected Component

Ollama proxy endpoints missing model access control:
- backend/open_webui/routers/ollama.py (lines 955-995, generate_completion)
- backend/open_webui/routers/ollama.py (lines 835-881, embed)
- backend/open_webui/routers/ollama.py (lines 891-937, embeddings)
- backend/open_webui/routers/ollama.py (lines 791-820, show_model_info)

Affected Versions

Current main branch (commit 6fdd19bf1) and likely all versions with Ollama model access control support.

Description

Four Ollama proxy endpoints accept any model name from the user and forward the request to the Ollama backend without checking whether the user is authorized to access that model. These endpoints only require get_verified_user (any authenticated non-pending user) and validate that the model exists in the full unfiltered model list, but never check AccessGrants.has_access().

This is in direct contrast with the /ollama/api/chat endpoint (line 1101-1122) which correctly validates model access grants and returns 403 for unauthorized users:

# /api/chat (line 1101-1122) — CORRECTLY checks access
if not bypass_filter and user.role == 'user':
    user_group_ids = {group.id for group in Groups.get_groups_by_member_id(user.id)}
    if not (
        user.id == model_info.user_id
        or AccessGrants.has_access(
            user_id=user.id, resource_type='model',
            resource_id=model_info.id, permission='read',
            user_group_ids=user_group_ids,
        )
    ):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail='Model not found')

# /api/generate (line 955-995) — NO access check at all
# /api/embed (line 835-881) — NO access check at all
# /api/embeddings (line 891-937) — NO access check at all
# /api/show (line 791-820) — NO access check at all

CVSS 3.1 Breakdown

| Metric | Value | Rationale |
|--------|-------|-----------|
| Attack Vector | Network (N) | Exploited remotely via API calls |
| Attack Complexity | Low (L) | Single API call with a known model name |
| Privileges Required | Low (L) | Requires any authenticated user account |
| User Interaction | None (N) | No victim interaction required |
| Scope | Unchanged (U) | Impact within the Ollama model access boundary |
| Confidentiality | Low (L) | /api/show exposes restricted model details including system prompts and parameters |
| Integrity | None (N) | No data modification |
| Availability | Low (L) | Unauthorized consumption of GPU/compute resources on restricted models |

Attack Scenario

Impact

Preconditions

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.