Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-41488
langchain-openai: Image token counting SSRF protection can be bypassed via DNS rebinding
- Class
- AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Server-side request forgery
- Affected
- langchain-openai (PyPI)
- Gets past
- SSRF protection
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
Image URLs are validated for private addresses and then fetched separately, so DNS rebinding lets the fetch reach internal hosts despite the check. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Summary
langchain-openai's _url_to_size() helper (used by get_num_tokens_from_messages for image token counting) validated URLs for SSRF protection and then fetched them in a separate network operation with independent DNS resolution. This left a TOCTOU / DNS rebinding window: an attacker-controlled hostname could resolve to a public IP during validation and then to a private/localhost IP during the actual fetch.
The practical impact is limited because the fetched response body is passed directly to Pillow's Image.open() to extract dimensions — the response content is never returned, logged, or otherwise exposed to the caller. An attacker cannot exfiltrate data from internal services through this path. A potential risk is blind probing (inferring whether an internal host/port is open based on timing or error behavior).
Affected versions
langchain-openai< 1.1.14
Patched versions
langchain-openai>= 1.1.14 (requireslangchain-core>= 1.2.31)
Affected code
File: libs/partners/openai/langchain_openai/chat_models/base.py — _url_to_size()
The vulnerable pattern was a validate-then-fetch with separate DNS resolution:
validate_safe_url(image_source, allow_private=False, allow_http=True)
# ... separate network operation with independent DNS resolution ...
response = httpx.get(image_source, timeout=timeout)
Fix
The fix replaces the validate-then-fetch pattern with an SSRF-safe httpx transport (SSRFSafeSyncTransport from langchain-core) that:
- Resolves DNS once and validates all returned IPs against a policy (private ranges, cloud metadata, localhost, k8s internal DNS)
- Pins the connection to the validated IP, eliminating the DNS rebinding window
- Disables redirect following to prevent redirect-based SSRF bypasses
This fix was released in langchain-openai 1.1.14.
References
- https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/security/advisories/GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41488
- https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/langchain-openai/PYSEC-2026-76.yaml
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.