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vm2: NodeVM builtin allowlist bypass via node:test.run() execArgv allows sandbox escape

CVE-2026-92948 ยท 2026-10-01 critical

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Sandbox escape
Affected
vm2 (npm)
Gets past
Sandbox or allowlist
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
0.7% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

Sandboxed code reaches the host node:test module through a scheme-prefixed require and starts an unsandboxed process using execArgv eval. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

On Node.js 24 and newer, vm2 can expose the host node:test module to sandboxed NodeVM code when the embedder explicitly allows the node:test builtin. Sandbox code can reach that module through require('node:node:test') and call run() with attacker-controlled execArgv.

node:test.run() starts a separate Node process for process-isolated test execution and forwards the supplied execArgv values to that process. Supplying --eval=<JavaScript> therefore executes arbitrary JavaScript in an unrestricted host Node process, outside the NodeVM sandbox.

The PoC confirms that direct sandbox imports of fs, child_process, module, and process remain denied before the spawned process imports host fs and writes a harmless marker.

Affected versions and environment

require: {
  builtin: ['node:test'],
  external: false
}

The lower version boundary was tested directly: vm2@3.9.5 blocks require('node:node:test'), while vm2@3.9.6 permits the exploit path. Representative releases through 3.11.5 were also reproduced.

Root cause

The issue is a combination of builtin admission, generic host passthrough, and prefix normalization:

builtins.set(key, special ? special : vm => vm.readonly(hostRequire(key)));
if (localStringPrototypeStartsWith(filename, 'node:')) {
  id = localStringPrototypeSlice(filename, 5);
  nmod = loadBuiltinModule(id);
}

The doubled prefix is the reachability mechanism, but the security boundary failure is broader: the generic host-passthrough loader treats the test builtin family as safe even though its run() API can launch unrestricted Node processes.

Proof of concept

From the poc directory:

npm ci --ignore-scripts --no-audit --no-fund
node repro.js

Expected successful result on Node.js 24+ includes:

{
  "vm2Version": "3.11.5",
  "nodeVersion": "v24.18.0",
  "markerExists": true,
  "childIsDistinctProcess": true,
  "marker": {
    "hostCodeExecution": true
  }
}

The PoC writes only host-rce-marker.json in its own directory and does not invoke a shell, contact a network service, or access third-party data.

Impact

An attacker who is intentionally permitted to execute untrusted JavaScript in the affected NodeVM configuration can escape the sandbox and execute arbitrary JavaScript under the embedder's operating-system identity.

This provides the spawned process with the host user's filesystem, environment, network, and process-execution permissions. It can therefore result in complete confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact for the hosting service.

Suggested remediation

Treat the normalized test builtin family as dangerous before wildcard expansion and explicit builtin registration.

For example, add test to DANGEROUS_BUILTINS so the existing prefix and family checks reject both node:test and node:test/reporters:

const DANGEROUS_BUILTINS = new Set([
  // existing entries
  'test'
]);

If test helpers must be exposed, provide a sandbox-local wrapper through mock or override that does not expose run(), process isolation, execArgv, or other host process controls.

Recommended regression cases:

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.