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langflow: /profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name} endpoint file reading

CVE-2026-33497 · 2026-03-20 high

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Path traversal and file access
Affected
langflow (PyPI)
CVSS
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
EPSS
20.0% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

The profile picture endpoint concatenates path parameters without checks, so traversal sequences let unauthenticated callers read arbitrary server files. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Vulnerability

Path Traversal in GET /api/v1/files/profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name}

The download_profile_picture function in src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/files.py constructed file paths by directly concatenating the user-supplied folder_name and file_name path parameters without sanitization or boundary validation. The resulting path was passed to the filesystem without verifying it remained within the intended directory.

An unauthenticated attacker could supply traversal sequences (e.g. ../secret_key) to navigate outside the profile pictures directory and read arbitrary files on the server filesystem.

This exposed the server to:

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Proof of Concept

curl --path-as-is 'http://<host>:7860/api/v1/files/profile_pictures/../secret_key'

A successful response returns the raw secret key value used to sign all JWT authentication tokens in the instance.

---

Fix

The fix was applied in src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/files.py (PR #12263).

Two layers of defense were introduced:

1. Typed path validation — the folder_name and file_name parameters were changed from plain str to ValidatedFolderName and ValidatedFileName annotated types that reject traversal characters at the FastAPI input layer.

2. Path containment check — Path.name is used to strip any directory component from the inputs before path construction, and Path.is_relative_to() verifies the resolved path remains within the allowed base directory. This replaces the previous startswith() check, which was susceptible to prefix-ambiguity bugs.

 @router.get("/profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name}")
 async def download_profile_picture(
-    folder_name: str,
-    file_name: str,
+    folder_name: ValidatedFolderName,
+    file_name: ValidatedFileName,
     settings_service: Annotated[SettingsService, Depends(get_settings_service)],
 ):
-        file_path = (config_path / "profile_pictures" / folder_name / file_name).resolve()
+        safe_folder = Path(folder_name).name
+        safe_file = Path(file_name).name
+        file_path = (config_path / "profile_pictures" / safe_folder / safe_file).resolve()

         allowed_base = (config_path / "profile_pictures").resolve()
-        if not str(file_path).startswith(str(allowed_base)):
-            raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Profile picture not found")
+        if not file_path.is_relative_to(allowed_base):
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Profile picture not found")

---

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, restrict network access to the /api/v1/files/profile_pictures/ endpoint at the reverse-proxy or firewall level. Rotating the secret_key is strongly recommended if exposure cannot be ruled out.

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Acknowledgements

We thank the security researcher who responsibly disclosed this vulnerability.

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.