INCIDENT MAP

Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-33744

BentoML has Dockerfile Command Injection via system_packages in bentofile.yaml

CVE-2026-33744 ยท 2026-03-26 high

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Code and command execution
Affected
bentoml (PyPI)
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

The system_packages values in bentofile.yaml are placed unquoted into Dockerfile RUN commands, so shell metacharacters in a package name run commands during the build. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

The docker.system_packages field in bentofile.yaml accepts arbitrary strings that are interpolated directly into Dockerfile RUN commands without sanitization. Since system_packages is semantically a list of OS package names (data), users do not expect values to be interpreted as shell commands. A malicious bentofile.yaml achieves arbitrary command execution during bentoml containerize / docker build.

Affected Component

Affected Versions

All versions supporting docker.system_packages in bentofile.yaml, confirmed on 1.4.36.

Steps to Reproduce

service.py:

import bentoml

@bentoml.service
class MyService:
    @bentoml.api
    def predict(self) -> str:
        return "hello"

bentofile.yaml:

service: "service:MyService"
docker:
  system_packages:
    - "curl && id > /tmp/bentoml-pwned #"
bentoml build
RUN apt-get install -q -y -o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confdef curl && id > /tmp/bentoml-pwned #

Root Cause

The system_packages field values are treated as package names (data) by the user but are string-formatted directly into shell commands in the Dockerfile:

# images.py:85-89
self.commands.append(
    CONTAINER_METADATA[self.distro]["install_command"].format(
        packages=" ".join(packages)  # No escaping
    )
)

Where install_command is "apt-get install -q -y -o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confdef {packages}".

A bash_quote filter (wrapping shlex.quote) exists in the codebase and is registered in both Jinja2 environments, but it is only applied to environment variable values, never to system_packages.

Impact

Suggested Fix

Option 1: Input validation (recommended)

Add a regex validator to system_packages in build_config.py:

import re

VALID_PACKAGE_NAME = re.compile(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9.+\-_:]*$')

def _validate_system_packages(instance, attribute, value):
    if value is None:
        return
    for pkg in value:
        if not VALID_PACKAGE_NAME.match(pkg):
            raise BentoMLException(
                f"Invalid system package name: {pkg!r}. "
                "Package names may only contain alphanumeric characters, "
                "dots, plus signs, hyphens, underscores, and colons."
            )

system_packages: t.Optional[t.List[str]] = attr.field(
    default=None, validator=_validate_system_packages
)

Option 2: Output escaping

Apply shlex.quote() to each package name before interpolation in images.py:system_packages() and apply the bash_quote Jinja2 filter in base_debian.j2.

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.