INCIDENT MAP

Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / GHSA-j8f7-x8jm-wmm4

Langflow: SSRF in URL-taking components (protection disabled by default / warn-only, not applied to RSS, SearXNG, Web Search, Home Assistant, Glean, Docling)

GHSA-j8f7-x8jm-wmm4 · 2026-10-06 moderate

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Server-side request forgery
Affected
langflow-base, langflow (PyPI)
Gets past
SSRF protection
CVSS
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N

How it works, in short

Flow components fetch author-supplied URLs without enforcing the private-address guard, so the server can reach internal endpoints and return responses. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

Before Langflow 1.10.3, several built-in components sent server-side HTTP requests to URLs the flow author controls, with no SSRF enforcement. An authenticated user who can build or run flows could make the Langflow server reach loopback, RFC 1918 / private networks, link-local addresses and cloud metadata endpoints (for example http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/), and in many cases read the response back through the component output.

Two things combined to cause this:

The problem was fixed across several PRs and is fully fixed in Langflow 1.10.3 (and 1.11.0+). With the default settings, outbound requests from these components are now validated after DNS resolution, pinned to the validated IP (to prevent DNS rebinding) and blocked when they target private, loopback, link-local or metadata addresses, unless the operator allowlists the host.

Affected versions

| Package (PyPI) | Vulnerable | Patched |
|---|---|---|
| langflow | < 1.10.3 | 1.10.3 |
| langflow-base | < 0.10.3 | 0.10.3 |
| lfx | < 1.10.3 | 1.10.3 |
| lfx-docling (Docling Serve component) | < 0.1.2 | 0.1.2 |

How the fix rolled out:

| Release | Change |
|---|---|
| < 1.7.0 | No SSRF guard. All URL-taking components make unrestricted requests. |
| 1.7.0 – 1.9.2 | Guard exists, but ssrf_protection_enabled=False by default and API Request uses warn_only=True. |
| 1.9.3 | #13016: protection on by default, API Request blocks (DNS pinning / anti-rebinding). Other components still unprotected. |
| 1.10.1 | #13395 (RSS Reader, SearXNG) and #13643 (Home Assistant, Glean, plus model-provider URL components) route requests through SSRF-safe helpers. |
| 1.10.3 | #14033 (Docling Serve) and #14071 (Web Search result/RSS fetching). All components cited in this report are protected. |

Details

Vulnerable pattern (for example rss.py before #13395):

response = requests.get(self.rss_url, timeout=self.timeout)

API Request before #13016:

# TODO: In next major version (2.0), remove warn_only=True to enforce blocking
validate_url_for_ssrf(url, warn_only=True)

with ssrf_protection_enabled: bool = False in the settings.

Clarifications on the original report. Some sinks in the report are not exploitable SSRF:

PoC (vulnerable versions)

On patched versions the same run fails with SSRFProtectionError: Access to IP address 169.254.169.254 is blocked by SSRF protection.

Impact

Fix

  -    ssrf_protection_enabled: bool = False
  +    ssrf_protection_enabled: bool = True
  
  -            response = requests.get(self.rss_url, timeout=self.timeout)
  +            response = ssrf_safe_get(self.rss_url, timeout=self.timeout)
  

Note: connector-style components (for example Home Assistant, Ollama, LM Studio) keep a documented loopback exemption (#14146), so a self-hosted user can reach a local service on localhost. Private-network and metadata addresses stay blocked. Operators can tighten or relax this with LANGFLOW_SSRF_ALLOWED_HOSTS and LANGFLOW_CONNECTOR_SSRF_VALIDATION_ENABLED.

Remediation

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.