Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-44550
Open WebUI's Mass Assignment via Pydantic extra='allow' Allows Creating Folders in Other Users' Accounts
- Class
- AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the source)
- Technique
- Authentication and access control
- Affected
- open-webui (PyPI)
- Gets past
- Authorisation check
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
Folder creation copies client-supplied fields over the server-assigned owner, letting a user set another account as the folder owner. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Mass Assignment via Pydantic extra='allow' Allows Creating Folders in Other Users' Accounts
Affected Component
Folder creation endpoint and form model:
- backend/open_webui/models/folders.py (lines 72-77, FolderForm with extra='allow')
- backend/open_webui/models/folders.py (lines 95-106, insert_new_folder dict construction)
- backend/open_webui/routers/folders.py (line 119, create_folder endpoint)
Affected Versions
Current main branch (commit 6fdd19bf1) and likely all versions since FolderForm adopted extra='allow'.
Description
FolderForm uses model_config = ConfigDict(extra='allow'), which permits arbitrary fields to pass through Pydantic validation and be included in model_dump(exclude_unset=True). In insert_new_folder, the server-assigned user_id is placed at the start of the dict and then overwritten by the spread of form data:
# models/folders.py:95-106
folder = FolderModel(
**{
'id': id, # server
'user_id': user_id, # server โ overwritten below
**(form_data.model_dump(exclude_unset=True) or {}), # user-controlled (extra='allow')
'parent_id': parent_id,
'created_at': int(time.time()),
'updated_at': int(time.time()),
}
)
Because FolderModel declares user_id: str as a real field (not just a form extra), any attacker-supplied user_id in the POST body is accepted by the model and persisted on the Folder row.
Attack Scenario
- Attacker discovers a victim's user ID. User UUIDs commonly leak via the user search endpoint (
GET /api/v1/users/search, intentionally accessible to verified users for sharing UI), shared chat metadata, or channel member lists. - Attacker sends: