Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-44556
Open WebUI's responses passthrough endpoint lacks access control authorization
- Class
- AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Authentication and access control
- Also involves
- Unbounded Consumption
- Affected
- open-webui (PyPI)
- Gets past
- Authorisation check
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
The responses proxy only checks that a user is logged in, not per-model access rules, so any authenticated user can call models that were restricted to others. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Summary
The /responses endpoint in the OpenAI router accepts any authenticated user and forwards requests directly to upstream LLM providers without enforcing per-model access control. While the primary chat completion endpoint (generate_chat_completion) checks model ownership, group membership, and AccessGrants before allowing a request, the /responses proxy only validates that the user has a valid session via get_verified_user.
This allows any authenticated user — regardless of role or group assignment — to interact with any model configured on the instance by sending a POST request to /api/openai/responses with an arbitrary model ID.
Impact
As per OWASP TOP 10 LLM:
- Model Denial of Service (OWASP LLM04): An unauthorized user can submit resource-intensive requests to expensive models (e.g., o1-pro, GPT-4o) that were explicitly restricted by the administrator. In shared deployments, this can exhaust API budgets or rate limits, causing total service disruption for all legitimate users.
- Model Theft (OWASP LLM10): If the instance proxies access to fine-tuned or self-hosted models, unauthorized users can freely interact with them, enabling capability extraction or model distillation without authorization.
- Access Policy Bypass: Administrators lose the ability to enforce cost-tier restrictions, team-based model assignments, or compliance boundaries through the existing access control system.
The endpoint is a raw passthrough proxy and does not resolve workspace model configurations (system prompts, knowledge bases, RAG pipelines). Therefore, workspace-specific confidential data is not directly exposed through this vector.
PR: https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/23481
References
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-hp5m-24vp-vq2q
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44556
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/23481
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.