Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-44568
Open WebUI has Stored XSS in Pending User Overlay via Incorrect DOMPurify Application Order
- Class
- AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Cross-site scripting
- Affected
- open-webui (PyPI)
- Gets past
- Input filter or sanitiser
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
Running the sanitiser before Markdown parsing lets javascript: links created during parsing reach the page unfiltered, enabling stored script execution. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Vulnerability Details
CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting (XSS)
The AccountPending.svelte component renders the admin-configured "Pending User Overlay Content" using marked.parse() inside {@html} with an incorrect DOMPurify application order:
Vulnerable Code
src/lib/components/layout/Overlay/AccountPending.svelte (lines 43-48):
{@html marked.parse(
DOMPurify.sanitize(
($config?.ui?.pending_user_overlay_content ?? '').replace(/\n/g, '<br>')
)
)}
DOMPurify is applied to the raw Markdown input before marked.parse() processes it. This is the wrong order. DOMPurify sanitizes the Markdown text (which contains no HTML tags), then marked.parse() converts Markdown link syntax into HTML <a> tags with javascript: href, and the result is rendered with {@html} unsanitized.
The correct pattern (used elsewhere in the codebase, e.g., NotebookView.svelte:77) is:
DOMPurify.sanitize(marked.parse(src)) // sanitize AFTER markdown parsing
Steps to Reproduce
Prerequisites
- Open WebUI v0.8.10 - Admin account - A second user account with "pending" role
Steps
- Log in as admin and navigate to Admin Settings → Settings → General.
- Set Default User Role to
pending.
- In the Pending User Overlay Content field, enter:
# Account Pending
Your account is under review.
[Contact Support](javascript:alert(document.domain))
- Save the settings.
- In a separate browser (or incognito window), create a new account or log in as a pending user.
- The pending overlay is displayed. Click the "Contact Support" link.
- A JavaScript alert dialog appears showing
localhost(the document domain), confirming XSS execution.
Verified Output
The alert(document.domain) executes successfully, displaying "localhost" in a JavaScript dialog box.
Impact
An admin can inject arbitrary JavaScript into the Pending User Overlay Content that executes in the browser context of any pending user who views the overlay page. This could be used to:
- Session hijacking: Steal pending users' JWT tokens from cookies/localStorage
- Credential theft: Replace the pending overlay with a fake login form
- Phishing: Redirect pending users to malicious sites
While this requires admin privileges to set the overlay content, it enables an admin to attack pending users (who have not yet been granted full access). In multi-admin deployments, a compromised admin account could use this to escalate attacks.
Proposed Fix
Apply DOMPurify after marked.parse(), not before:
<!-- Before (vulnerable): -->
{@html marked.parse(
DOMPurify.sanitize(
($config?.ui?.pending_user_overlay_content ?? '').replace(/\n/g, '<br>')
)
)}
<!-- After (fixed): -->
{@html DOMPurify.sanitize(
marked.parse(
($config?.ui?.pending_user_overlay_content ?? '').replace(/\n/g, '<br>'),
{ async: false }
)
)}
<img width="1510" height="1093" alt="2026-03-23_03-07" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bcc94dd6-4f06-472b-9979-9759458c76b3" />
References
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-fq3v-xjjx-95rc
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44568
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.