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Open WebUI has Stored XSS in Pending User Overlay via Incorrect DOMPurify Application Order

CVE-2026-44568 · 2026-05-08 moderate

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Cross-site scripting
Affected
open-webui (PyPI)
Gets past
Input filter or sanitiser
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

Running the sanitiser before Markdown parsing lets javascript: links created during parsing reach the page unfiltered, enabling stored script execution. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Vulnerability Details

CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

The AccountPending.svelte component renders the admin-configured "Pending User Overlay Content" using marked.parse() inside {@html} with an incorrect DOMPurify application order:

Vulnerable Code

src/lib/components/layout/Overlay/AccountPending.svelte (lines 43-48):

{@html marked.parse(
    DOMPurify.sanitize(
        ($config?.ui?.pending_user_overlay_content ?? '').replace(/\n/g, '<br>')
    )
)}

DOMPurify is applied to the raw Markdown input before marked.parse() processes it. This is the wrong order. DOMPurify sanitizes the Markdown text (which contains no HTML tags), then marked.parse() converts Markdown link syntax into HTML <a> tags with javascript: href, and the result is rendered with {@html} unsanitized.

The correct pattern (used elsewhere in the codebase, e.g., NotebookView.svelte:77) is:

DOMPurify.sanitize(marked.parse(src))  // sanitize AFTER markdown parsing

Steps to Reproduce

Prerequisites

- Open WebUI v0.8.10 - Admin account - A second user account with "pending" role

Steps

# Account Pending

Your account is under review.

[Contact Support](javascript:alert(document.domain))

Verified Output

The alert(document.domain) executes successfully, displaying "localhost" in a JavaScript dialog box.

Impact

An admin can inject arbitrary JavaScript into the Pending User Overlay Content that executes in the browser context of any pending user who views the overlay page. This could be used to:

While this requires admin privileges to set the overlay content, it enables an admin to attack pending users (who have not yet been granted full access). In multi-admin deployments, a compromised admin account could use this to escalate attacks.

Proposed Fix

Apply DOMPurify after marked.parse(), not before:

<!-- Before (vulnerable): -->
{@html marked.parse(
    DOMPurify.sanitize(
        ($config?.ui?.pending_user_overlay_content ?? '').replace(/\n/g, '<br>')
    )
)}

<!-- After (fixed): -->
{@html DOMPurify.sanitize(
    marked.parse(
        ($config?.ui?.pending_user_overlay_content ?? '').replace(/\n/g, '<br>'),
        { async: false }
    )
)}

<img width="1510" height="1093" alt="2026-03-23_03-07" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bcc94dd6-4f06-472b-9979-9759458c76b3" />

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.