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Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-44555

Open WebUI's Base Model Routing Bypasses Access Control via Model Chaining

CVE-2026-44555 · 2026-05-08 high

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the source)
Technique
Authentication and access control
Affected
open-webui (PyPI)
Gets past
Authorisation check
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

Composed models can point base_model_id at a restricted model, and the chained base model's access is never checked at request time or creation. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Base Model Routing Bypasses Access Control via Model Chaining

Affected Component

Model chaining via base_model_id:
- backend/open_webui/routers/models.py (lines 170-214, create_new_model)
- backend/open_webui/routers/models.py (lines 254-308, import_models)
- backend/open_webui/main.py (lines 1696-1711, base model resolution in chat completion)
- backend/open_webui/routers/openai.py (lines 1032-1037, base model payload rewrite)
- backend/open_webui/routers/ollama.py (lines 1086-1090, base model payload rewrite)
- backend/open_webui/utils/models.py (line 380, check_model_access — checks user-facing model only)

Affected Versions

Current main branch (commit 6fdd19bf1) and likely all versions with the model chaining (base_model_id) feature.

Description

Open WebUI supports model composition via base_model_id: a user-defined model (e.g., "Cheap Assistant") can reference an existing base model (e.g., "gpt-4-turbo-restricted") that provides the actual inference capability. When a user queries the composed model, the access control pipeline verifies the user has access to the composed model but never re-verifies access to the chained base model.

Additionally, the model creation and import endpoints accept arbitrary base_model_id values without checking that the caller has access to that base model. Combined, this allows any user with the default model creation permission to create a model that chains to a restricted base model — and then invoke it, causing the server to dispatch the request to the restricted base model using the admin-configured API key.

# utils/models.py:380 — access check runs against the user-facing model only
def check_model_access(user, model):
    if user.role == 'user':
        ...check access grants on `model`...

# main.py:1696-1711 — base model resolved without access check
base_model = request.app.state.MODELS.get(model.info.base_model_id)
if base_model:
    # payload["model"] is rewritten to base_model.id
    # but no check_model_access(user, base_model) is performed

# openai.py:1032-1037 / ollama.py:1086-1090 — the rewritten payload is dispatched
payload['model'] = base_model_id

Attack Scenario

The creation endpoint does not validate the attacker's access to gpt-4-turbo-restricted.
3. Attacker now owns cheap-assistant. check_model_access(attacker, cheap-assistant) passes trivially because they are the owner.
4. Attacker sends:

   POST /api/chat/completions
   {"model": "cheap-assistant", "messages": [...]}
   

The same bypass is available via the import endpoint, which additionally allows overwriting existing models (see related finding on model import ownership).

Impact

Preconditions

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.