Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-44555
Open WebUI's Base Model Routing Bypasses Access Control via Model Chaining
- Class
- AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the source)
- Technique
- Authentication and access control
- Affected
- open-webui (PyPI)
- Gets past
- Authorisation check
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
Composed models can point base_model_id at a restricted model, and the chained base model's access is never checked at request time or creation. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Base Model Routing Bypasses Access Control via Model Chaining
Affected Component
Model chaining via base_model_id:
- backend/open_webui/routers/models.py (lines 170-214, create_new_model)
- backend/open_webui/routers/models.py (lines 254-308, import_models)
- backend/open_webui/main.py (lines 1696-1711, base model resolution in chat completion)
- backend/open_webui/routers/openai.py (lines 1032-1037, base model payload rewrite)
- backend/open_webui/routers/ollama.py (lines 1086-1090, base model payload rewrite)
- backend/open_webui/utils/models.py (line 380, check_model_access — checks user-facing model only)
Affected Versions
Current main branch (commit 6fdd19bf1) and likely all versions with the model chaining (base_model_id) feature.
Description
Open WebUI supports model composition via base_model_id: a user-defined model (e.g., "Cheap Assistant") can reference an existing base model (e.g., "gpt-4-turbo-restricted") that provides the actual inference capability. When a user queries the composed model, the access control pipeline verifies the user has access to the composed model but never re-verifies access to the chained base model.
Additionally, the model creation and import endpoints accept arbitrary base_model_id values without checking that the caller has access to that base model. Combined, this allows any user with the default model creation permission to create a model that chains to a restricted base model — and then invoke it, causing the server to dispatch the request to the restricted base model using the admin-configured API key.
# utils/models.py:380 — access check runs against the user-facing model only
def check_model_access(user, model):
if user.role == 'user':
...check access grants on `model`...
# main.py:1696-1711 — base model resolved without access check
base_model = request.app.state.MODELS.get(model.info.base_model_id)
if base_model:
# payload["model"] is rewritten to base_model.id
# but no check_model_access(user, base_model) is performed
# openai.py:1032-1037 / ollama.py:1086-1090 — the rewritten payload is dispatched
payload['model'] = base_model_id
Attack Scenario
- Admin provisions a premium/restricted model
gpt-4-turbo-restrictedand configures access grants so only the "ML Engineers" group can use it. - Attacker (a regular user not in that group) calls: