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RMCP: Custom HTTP headers leak to cross-origin redirect targets

CVE-2026-64684 · 2026-09-17 moderate

Class
MCP and Tool Server Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Information exposure
Also involves
Sensitive Data Disclosure
Affected
rmcp (crates.io)
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
EPSS
0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

The Rust MCP client forwards custom auth headers on cross-origin 307 and 308 redirects, so an attacker-controlled target receives them. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

The rmcp crate's StreamableHttpClientTransport forwards caller-supplied custom HTTP headers (such as X-API-Key, X-Auth-Token, Api-Key) to cross-origin redirect targets. The default_http_client() function builds a reqwest::Client without a redirect policy override, so the default limited(10) policy follows 307/308 redirects and forwards all per-request headers except Authorization, Cookie, and Proxy-Authorization. Custom auth headers injected via StreamableHttpClientTransportConfig.custom_headers are not classified as sensitive and are therefore forwarded verbatim to any redirect target — including an attacker-controlled server.

Affected versions

Vulnerability

File: crates/rmcp/src/transport/common/reqwest/streamable_http_client.rs

Root cause 1 — no redirect policy override:

// Lines 302-307
fn default_http_client() -> reqwest::Client {
    reqwest::Client::builder()
        .pool_max_idle_per_host(0)
        .build()
        .expect("failed to build default reqwest client")
}

No .redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none()) call. The default limited(10) policy follows up to 10 redirects and, on cross-origin redirects, strips only Authorization, Cookie, and Proxy-Authorization.

Root cause 2 — custom headers not sensitivity-marked:

// Lines 26-35
fn apply_custom_headers(
    mut builder: reqwest::RequestBuilder,
    custom_headers: HashMap<HeaderName, HeaderValue>,
) -> Result<reqwest::RequestBuilder, StreamableHttpError<reqwest::Error>> {
    for (name, value) in custom_headers {
        validate_custom_header(&name).map_err(StreamableHttpError::ReservedHeaderConflict)?;
        builder = builder.header(name, value);  // no sensitivity marker
    }
    Ok(builder)
}

Headers added via RequestBuilder::header() are forwarded to redirect targets because reqwest only strips headers from its own sensitive-header list (Authorization, Cookie, Proxy-Authorization).

Exposed API: StreamableHttpClientTransportConfig.custom_headers (line 1070), intended for custom auth headers:

/// Custom HTTP headers to include with every request
pub custom_headers: HashMap<HeaderName, HeaderValue>,

Attack scenario

Negative control

The auth_header path (StreamableHttpClientTransportConfig::auth_header()) sets the value via builder.bearer_auth(auth_header), which maps to the Authorization header — stripped by reqwest on cross-origin redirects. That path is not affected. Only custom_headers is vulnerable.

Fix

In default_http_client(), disable automatic redirect following:

fn default_http_client() -> reqwest::Client {
    reqwest::Client::builder()
        .pool_max_idle_per_host(0)
        .redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none())  // <-- add this
        .build()
        .expect("failed to build default reqwest client")
}

The transport can then inspect 3xx responses and decide whether to follow, stripping sensitive headers before doing so. Alternatively, use reqwest::ClientBuilder::connection_verbose or per-request Request::headers_mut() to remove auth headers before the redirect is followed.

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.