Browse / MCP and Tool Server Flaws / CVE-2026-64684
RMCP: Custom HTTP headers leak to cross-origin redirect targets
- Class
- MCP and Tool Server Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Information exposure
- Also involves
- Sensitive Data Disclosure
- Affected
- rmcp (crates.io)
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
The Rust MCP client forwards custom auth headers on cross-origin 307 and 308 redirects, so an attacker-controlled target receives them. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Summary
The rmcp crate's StreamableHttpClientTransport forwards caller-supplied custom HTTP headers (such as X-API-Key, X-Auth-Token, Api-Key) to cross-origin redirect targets. The default_http_client() function builds a reqwest::Client without a redirect policy override, so the default limited(10) policy follows 307/308 redirects and forwards all per-request headers except Authorization, Cookie, and Proxy-Authorization. Custom auth headers injected via StreamableHttpClientTransportConfig.custom_headers are not classified as sensitive and are therefore forwarded verbatim to any redirect target — including an attacker-controlled server.
Affected versions
- Repository:
github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk - Crate:
rmcp - Commit tested:
c330fede90e4729c234f8e87fdbc5ea27a1dd10c(HEAD, 2026-05-21)
Vulnerability
File: crates/rmcp/src/transport/common/reqwest/streamable_http_client.rs
Root cause 1 — no redirect policy override:
// Lines 302-307
fn default_http_client() -> reqwest::Client {
reqwest::Client::builder()
.pool_max_idle_per_host(0)
.build()
.expect("failed to build default reqwest client")
}
No .redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none()) call. The default limited(10) policy follows up to 10 redirects and, on cross-origin redirects, strips only Authorization, Cookie, and Proxy-Authorization.
Root cause 2 — custom headers not sensitivity-marked:
// Lines 26-35
fn apply_custom_headers(
mut builder: reqwest::RequestBuilder,
custom_headers: HashMap<HeaderName, HeaderValue>,
) -> Result<reqwest::RequestBuilder, StreamableHttpError<reqwest::Error>> {
for (name, value) in custom_headers {
validate_custom_header(&name).map_err(StreamableHttpError::ReservedHeaderConflict)?;
builder = builder.header(name, value); // no sensitivity marker
}
Ok(builder)
}
Headers added via RequestBuilder::header() are forwarded to redirect targets because reqwest only strips headers from its own sensitive-header list (Authorization, Cookie, Proxy-Authorization).
Exposed API: StreamableHttpClientTransportConfig.custom_headers (line 1070), intended for custom auth headers:
/// Custom HTTP headers to include with every request
pub custom_headers: HashMap<HeaderName, HeaderValue>,
Attack scenario
- A caller sets
custom_headerswith an API key for the MCP server: