INCIDENT MAP

Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-48746

vLLM: OpenAI auth bypass

CVE-2026-48746 ยท 2026-06-16 critical

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Authentication and access control
Affected
vllm (PyPI)
Gets past
Authentication check
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
EPSS
1.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

A crafted Host header changes the path the auth middleware parses, so /v1 requests skip the API key check while still being routed. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

A vulnerability in ASGI web servers and starlette's trust on those web servers enables an authentication bypass of the OpenAI API AuthenticationMiddleware, which was discovered during @x41sec's source code audit.
It allows to use the API without providing the configured VLLM_API_KEY or --api-key.

Details

In https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/v0.14.0/vllm/entrypoints/openai/api_server.py#L689-L692 the url_path is taken from the URL, which is reconstructed by _starlette_ based on the request scope.

from starlette.datastructures import URL, Headers, MutableHeaders, State

# ...

url_path = URL(scope=scope).path.removeprefix(root_path)
headers = Headers(scope=scope)
if url_path.startswith("/v1") and not self.verify_token(headers):
    response = JSONResponse(content={"error": "Unauthorized"}, status_code=401)
    return response(scope, receive, send)
return self.app(scope, receive, send)

The request scope includes the request's Host: header and reconstructs the URL as shown below:

f"{scheme}://{host_header}{path}"

Neither starlette nor any of the ASGI servers (including uvicorn, which vllm uses) properly filter the Host: header for invalid characters. This allows an attacker to include special URL characters such as / or ? in the Host: header and thereby control the reconstructed URL and it's .path attribute.

FastAPI/starlette's routing uses the HTTP path and does not depend on the parsed url.path attribute, allowing attackers to reach an endpoint via a certain path while providing a different value in the .path.

Impact

- Instances of vllm that use an API Key for the OpenAI API and expose the API to attackers. - Instances behind an RFC-conforming web server (such as nginx) are not affected.

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.