Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-34046
Langflow: Authenticated Users Can Read, Modify, and Delete Any Flow via Missing Ownership Check
- Class
- AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Authentication and access control
- Affected
- langflow-base, langflow (PyPI)
- Gets past
- Authorisation check
- CVSS
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- EPSS
- 0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
Flow read, update and delete routes query by flow ID alone with no ownership filter, letting any authenticated user act on other users' flows. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Vulnerability
IDOR in GET/PATCH/DELETE /api/v1/flow/{flow_id}
The _read_flow helper in src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/flows.py branched on the AUTO_LOGIN setting to decide whether to filter by user_id. When AUTO_LOGIN was False (i.e., authentication was enabled), neither branch enforced an ownership check โ the query returned any flow matching the given UUID regardless of who owned it.
This exposed any authenticated user to:
- Read any other user's flow, including embedded plaintext API keys
- Modify the logic of another user's AI agents
- Delete flows belonging to other users
The vulnerability was introduced by the conditional logic that was meant to accommodate public/example flows (those with user_id = NULL) under auto-login mode, but inadvertently left the authenticated path without an ownership filter.
---
Fix (PR #8956)
The fix removes the AUTO_LOGIN conditional entirely and unconditionally scopes the query to the requesting user:
- auth_settings = settings_service.auth_settings
- stmt = select(Flow).where(Flow.id == flow_id)
- if auth_settings.AUTO_LOGIN:
- stmt = stmt.where(
- (Flow.user_id == user_id) | (Flow.user_id == None) # noqa: E711
- )
+ stmt = select(Flow).where(Flow.id == flow_id).where(Flow.user_id == user_id)
All three operations โ read, update, and delete โ route through _read_flow, so the single change covers the full attack surface. A cross-user isolation test (test_read_flows_user_isolation) was added to prevent regression.
---
Acknowledgements
Langflow thanks the security researcher who responsibly disclosed this vulnerability:
References
- https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-8c4j-f57c-35cf
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34046
- https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/8956
- https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.