Browse / RAG and Vector Store Weaknesses / CVE-2026-44554
Open WebUI has Knowledge Base Destruction and RAG Poisoning via Unauthorized Collection Overwrite
- Class
- RAG and Vector Store Weaknesses (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Authentication and access control
- Also involves
- AI Framework and Platform Flaws
- Affected
- open-webui (PyPI)
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
A web-retrieval endpoint accepts any collection name and overwrites it without ownership checks, so other users' vector collections can be deleted or poisoned. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Knowledge Base Destruction and RAG Poisoning via Unauthorized Collection Overwrite
Affected Component
Retrieval web/YouTube processing endpoints:
- backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py (lines 1810-1837, process_web)
- backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py (the parallel process_youtube endpoint)
- backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py (line 1445, save_docs_to_vector_db call chain)
Affected Versions
Current main branch (commit 6fdd19bf1) and likely all versions with RAG/knowledge base functionality.
Description
The POST /api/v1/retrieval/process/web endpoint accepts a user-supplied collection_name and an overwrite query parameter (default: True). It performs no authorization check on whether the calling user owns or has write access to the target collection. When overwrite=True, save_docs_to_vector_db calls VECTOR_DB_CLIENT.delete_collection() on the target collection before writing new content.
Combined with the knowledge base enumeration vulnerability (separate report), an attacker can trivially discover any user's knowledge base UUID and then destroy or poison it.
# retrieval.py:1810-1837 — no collection authorization check
@router.post('/process/web')
async def process_web(
request: Request,
form_data: ProcessUrlForm,
user=Depends(get_verified_user),
...
):
# ... fetch and process the URL ...
save_docs_to_vector_db(
request=request,
docs=docs,
collection_name=form_data.collection_name, # attacker-controlled, unchecked
overwrite=overwrite, # defaults to True
...
)
CVSS 3.1 Breakdown
| Metric | Value | Rationale |
|--------|-------|-----------|
| Attack Vector | Network (N) | Exploited remotely via API call |
| Attack Complexity | Low (L) | Single API call with a known KB UUID |
| Privileges Required | Low (L) | Requires any authenticated user account |
| User Interaction | None (N) | No victim interaction required |
| Scope | Unchanged (U) | Impact within the knowledge base authorization boundary |
| Confidentiality | None (N) | No data disclosure from this vulnerability directly |
| Integrity | High (H) | Complete replacement of victim's KB content with attacker-controlled data |
| Availability | High (H) | Victim's original KB embeddings are deleted; KB effectively destroyed |
Attack Scenario
- Attacker discovers victim's KB UUID via the
knowledge-basesmeta-collection (separate finding) or other enumeration. - Attacker sends: