Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-78680
NLTK: Uncontrolled search path when invoking the Graphviz 'dot' binary
- Class
- AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Code and command execution
- Affected
- nltk (PyPI)
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
The dot binary is launched by bare name, so a planted file named dot in the working directory or a PATH entry runs instead of Graphviz. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Two NLTK sites executed the Graphviz dot program by bare name, so process creation resolved it via the search path — and on Windows via the current working directory — rather than a validated absolute location. An attacker who can place a file named dot where resolution looks (the CWD on Windows, or a writable/relative entry such as . on PATH) has their binary executed in place of Graphviz (arbitrary code execution).
Affected (<= 3.10.2):
- nltk.parse.dependencygraph.dot2img — called find_binary("dot") but discarded the returned validated path and then ran the bare name ["dot", ...], so the validation had no effect.
- nltk.translate.api.AlignedSent._repr_svg_ — ran the bare name with no validation at all (IPython SVG rendering).
This is the same class already fixed for the senna, weka, boxer, malt, repp and hunpos wrappers. nltk.internals.find_binary refuses a CWD-relative match for a bare tool name and returns only a trusted absolute path; the fix runs that path in both sites.
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Attack demonstration
Captured output, not illustrative. A ./dot that writes a PWNED marker, planted in the CWD with . prepended to PATH.
The vulnerable behaviour (old bare-name exec):
Control (OLD behavior) — bare ['dot'] in this dir with '.' on PATH:
bare ['dot'] executed planted binary = True
The patched functions refuse it:
FIXED code, with ./dot planted and '.' on PATH:
dependencygraph.dot2img : Exception "Cannot find the dot binary..." | planted-binary-executed=False safe
AlignedSent._repr_svg_ : Exception "Cannot find the dot binary..." | planted-binary-executed=False safe
And find_binary itself was attacked directly (the fix trusts nothing else):
Attack 1: ./dot in CWD, no dot on PATH -> LookupError (refused) safe
Attack 2: ./dot/dot (dir 'dot' holding 'dot') -> LookupError (refused) safe
Attack 3: '.' on PATH + ./dot -> LookupError (refused) safe
Attack 4: attacker-writable ABSOLUTE dir on PATH -> returned /…/evilbin/dot (absolute)
Attack 4 is out of scope: trusting an absolute directory that is already on PATH is the operating system's own trust model — an attacker who can write to a PATH directory owns the account regardless of NLTK. find_binary defends specifically against the CWD/relative injection that bare-name exec is vulnerable to (attacks 1–3), which is exactly what this fix inherits.
Environment: python 3.13.7. dot is not required to reproduce — the planted binary is the payload.
References
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-6hwm-xvph-95vm
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78680
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/1a3cd1764ab3deb084fb66d0ffb4873717659538
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/releases/tag/v3.10.3
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-before-arbitrary-code-execution-via-graphviz-dot-binary
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.