Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-45299
Open WebUI has Stored Cross-Site Scripting In Profile Picture
- Class
- AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Cross-site scripting
- Affected
- open-webui (PyPI)
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
Profile image data URIs with arbitrary MIME types are served from the app origin, so an embedded SVG script runs for anyone who views the image. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Summary
The profile_image_url field on the user profile update form accepted arbitrary data: URI values without MIME-type validation. Two distinct attack paths were independently demonstrated by separate reporters:
data:text/html;base64,...in a new browser tab (raresvis, 2025-04-17) — when a victim right-clicks a user's profile picture and chooses "Open image in new tab", the browser navigates to the data: URL and executes embedded scripts in thedata:origin. Limited to social-engineering / redirect attacks because the script does not run in the application origin.
data:image/svg+xml;base64,...re-served by the application origin (Gh05t666nero, 2026-01-09) —GET /api/v1/users/{user_id}/profile/imagedecoded the base64 and returnedStreamingResponse(media_type=<user-controlled>)extracted from thedata:header. Withmedia_type=image/svg+xmlandContent-Disposition: inline, the SVG-embedded scripts executed in the application origin, enabling JWT theft fromlocalStorageand full account takeover of any user — including admins — who loaded the malicious profile image URL.
Both attack paths share the same root cause (lack of MIME-type validation on profile_image_url) and are closed by the same fix.
Vulnerable code (v0.7.0)
backend/open_webui/routers/users.py get_user_profile_image_by_id():
elif user.profile_image_url.startswith("data:image"):
header, base64_data = user.profile_image_url.split(",", 1)
image_data = base64.b64decode(base64_data)
image_buffer = io.BytesIO(image_data)
media_type = header.split(";")[0].lstrip("data:") # user-controlled
return StreamingResponse(
image_buffer,
media_type=media_type,
headers={"Content-Disposition": "inline"},
)
Fix
Commit 773787c74 (2026-02-11), first contained in tag v0.8.0, applies the validate_profile_image_url field validator to every form that accepts profile_image_url (UserModel, UpdateProfileForm, SignupForm in backend/open_webui/models/users.py and backend/open_webui/models/auths.py). The validator explicitly rejects data:image/svg+xml and any non-image data URI, allowing only data:image/{png,jpeg,gif,webp};base64 plus known internal paths and http(s):// URLs. This blocks both attack vectors at form submission time, so a malicious URL can no longer be persisted to the database.
Credits
- raresvis — discovered the
data:text/html-via-new-tab path - Gh05t666nero — discovered the
data:image/svg+xml-via-server-side path (the more severe origin-XSS vector that determined the consolidated CVSS)
Per our Report Handling policy, the cluster is consolidated into the earliest filing with credit to every reporter who demonstrated a distinct exploitation path.
Affected / patched versions
- Affected:
< 0.8.0 - Patched:
>= 0.8.0
References
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-6gh2-q7cp-9qf6
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45299
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.8.0
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.