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Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-45397

Open WebUI Vulnerable to Unauthenticated RAG Configuration Disclosure

CVE-2026-45397 · 2026-05-14 moderate

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the source)
Technique
Authentication and access control
Affected
open-webui (PyPI)
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
EPSS
0.8% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

Open WebUI's RAG status route omits the authentication dependency that sibling routes use, so anyone can read the retrieval pipeline configuration. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Vulnerability Type: Information Disclosure / Missing Authentication
Severity: Medium
Component: backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py — get_status() (GET /)
Affected Endpoint: GET /api/v1/retrieval/
Affected Version: Open WebUI main branch — confirmed unpatched through v0.9.2
Authentication Required: None — internet-facing with zero credentials
CVSSv3.1 Score: 5.3 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N)

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Summary

GET /api/v1/retrieval/ returns live RAG pipeline configuration to any unauthenticated HTTP client. No Authorization header, cookie, or API key is required. Every adjacent endpoint on the same router (/embedding, /config) is correctly guarded by get_admin_user making this a targeted omission.

---

Root Cause

backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py:262

@router.get('/')
async def get_status(request: Request):   # ← no Depends(get_verified_user)
    return {
        'status': True,
        'CHUNK_SIZE': request.app.state.config.CHUNK_SIZE,
        'CHUNK_OVERLAP': request.app.state.config.CHUNK_OVERLAP,
        'RAG_TEMPLATE': request.app.state.config.RAG_TEMPLATE,
        'RAG_EMBEDDING_ENGINE': request.app.state.config.RAG_EMBEDDING_ENGINE,
        'RAG_EMBEDDING_MODEL': request.app.state.config.RAG_EMBEDDING_MODEL,
        'RAG_RERANKING_MODEL': request.app.state.config.RAG_RERANKING_MODEL,
        'RAG_EMBEDDING_BATCH_SIZE': request.app.state.config.RAG_EMBEDDING_BATCH_SIZE,
        'ENABLE_ASYNC_EMBEDDING': request.app.state.config.ENABLE_ASYNC_EMBEDDING,
        'RAG_EMBEDDING_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS': request.app.state.config.RAG_EMBEDDING_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS,
    }

Compare with every adjacent endpoint on the same router:

@router.get('/embedding')
async def get_embedding_config(request: Request, user=Depends(get_admin_user)):  # ✅

@router.get('/config')
async def get_rag_config(request: Request, user=Depends(get_admin_user)):        # ✅

---

Proof Of Concept — No Token Required

curl -s http://TARGET/api/v1/retrieval/
{
  "status": true,
  "CHUNK_SIZE": 1000,
  "CHUNK_OVERLAP": 100,
  "RAG_TEMPLATE": "### Task:\nRespond to the user query using the provided context...\n<context>\n{{CONTEXT}}\n</context>",
  "RAG_EMBEDDING_ENGINE": "",
  "RAG_EMBEDDING_MODEL": "sentence-transformers/all-MiniLM-L6-v2",
  "RAG_RERANKING_MODEL": "",
  "RAG_EMBEDDING_BATCH_SIZE": 1,
  "ENABLE_ASYNC_EMBEDDING": true,
  "RAG_EMBEDDING_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS": 0
}

---

Disclosed Information and Its Value to an Attacker

| Field | What it reveals |
|---|---|
| RAG_EMBEDDING_ENGINE | Backend type (OpenAI, Ollama, Azure, etc.) |
| RAG_EMBEDDING_MODEL | Exact model name — reveals embedding model |
| RAG_RERANKING_MODEL | Reranker in use — reveals reranker |
| RAG_TEMPLATE | RAG template — exposes the RAG template |
| CHUNK_SIZE / CHUNK_OVERLAP | Chunking parameters — enables exact reconstruction of how documents are split and retrieved |

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Attack Scenario

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Impact

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Recommended Fix

Add get_verified_user dependency (or get_admin_user for stricter control):

# BEFORE (vulnerable)
@router.get('/')
async def get_status(request: Request):


# AFTER
@router.get('/')
async def get_status(request: Request, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.