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Langflow vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery

CVE-2025-68477 · 2025-12-19 high

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Server-side request forgery
Affected
langflow (PyPI)
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
EPSS
6.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

The API Request node fetches any user-supplied URL without blocking internal or metadata addresses and returns the response to a caller holding only an API key. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Vulnerability Overview

Langflow provides an API Request component that can issue arbitrary HTTP requests within a flow. This component takes a user-supplied URL, performs only normalization and basic format checks, and then sends the request using a server-side httpx client. It does not block private IP ranges (127.0.0.1, the 10/172/192 ranges) or cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and it returns the response body as the result.

Because the flow execution endpoints (/api/v1/run, /api/v1/run/advanced) can be invoked with just an API key, if an attacker can control the API Request URL in a flow, non-blind SSRF is possible—accessing internal resources from the server’s network context. This enables requests to, and collection of responses from, internal administrative endpoints, metadata services, and internal databases/services, leading to information disclosure and providing a foothold for further attacks.

Vulnerable Code

1. When a flow runs, the API Request URL is set via user input or tweaks, or it falls back to the value stored in the node UI.

https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/endpoints.py#L349-L359


    @router.post("/run/{flow_id_or_name}", response_model=None, response_model_exclude_none=True)
    async def simplified_run_flow(
        *,
        background_tasks: BackgroundTasks,
        flow: Annotated[FlowRead | None, Depends(get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name)],
        input_request: SimplifiedAPIRequest | None = None,
        stream: bool = False,
        api_key_user: Annotated[UserRead, Depends(api_key_security)],
        context: dict | None = None,
        http_request: Request,
    ):
    

https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/endpoints.py#L573-L588


    @router.post(
        "/run/advanced/{flow_id_or_name}",
        response_model=RunResponse,
        response_model_exclude_none=True,
    )
    async def experimental_run_flow(
        *,
        session: DbSession,
        flow: Annotated[Flow, Depends(get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name)],
        inputs: list[InputValueRequest] | None = None,
        outputs: list[str] | None = None,
        tweaks: Annotated[Tweaks | None, Body(embed=True)] = None,
        stream: Annotated[bool, Body(embed=True)] = False,
        session_id: Annotated[None | str, Body(embed=True)] = None,
        api_key_user: Annotated[UserRead, Depends(api_key_security)],
    ) -> RunResponse:
    

https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L433-L438


            url = self._normalize_url(url)
    
            # Validate URL
            if not validators.url(url):
                msg = f"Invalid URL provided: {url}"
                raise ValueError(msg)
    

https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L335-L340


                # Base metadata
                metadata = {
                    "source": url,
                    "status_code": response.status_code,
                    "response_headers": response_headers,
                }
    

https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L364-L379


                # Handle response content
                if is_binary:
                    result = response.content
                else:
                    try:
                        result = response.json()
                    except json.JSONDecodeError:
                        self.log("Failed to decode JSON response")
                        result = response.text.encode("utf-8")
    
                metadata["result"] = result
    
                if include_httpx_metadata:
                    metadata.update({"headers": headers})
    
                return Data(data=metadata)
    

PoC

---

PoC Description

- I launched a Langflow server using the latest langflowai/langflow:latest Docker container, and a separate container internal-api that exposes an internal-only endpoint /internal on port 8000. Both containers were attached to the same user-defined network (ssrf-net), allowing communication by name or via the IP 172.18.0.3.
- I added an API Request node to a Langflow flow and set the URL to the internal service (http://172.18.0.3:8000/internal). Then I invoked /api/v1/run/advanced/<FLOW_ID> with an API key to perform SSRF. The response returned the internal service’s body in the result field, confirming non-blind SSRF.

PoC

<img width="1918" height="1029" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4883029f-bd56-4c23-b5a3-6f8a84dbcce1" />

Impact

---

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.