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Open WebUI: Redis Cache Keys tool_servers and terminal_servers Missing Instance Prefix Enable Cross-Instance Cache Poisoning

CVE-2026-44552 · 2026-05-08 high

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Other weaknesses
Affected
open-webui (PyPI)
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

Redis keys for tool and terminal server configuration lack an instance prefix, so separate deployments sharing Redis overwrite each other's config. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Redis Cache Keys tool_servers and terminal_servers Missing Instance Prefix Enable Cross-Instance Cache Poisoning

Affected Component

Tool server and terminal server Redis cache:
- backend/open_webui/utils/tools.py (line 841, tool_servers SET)
- backend/open_webui/utils/tools.py (line 850, tool_servers GET)
- backend/open_webui/utils/tools.py (line 976, terminal_servers SET)
- backend/open_webui/utils/tools.py (line 986, terminal_servers GET)

Affected Versions

Current main branch (commit 6fdd19bf1) and likely all versions since the tool server / terminal server Redis cache was introduced.

Description

Open WebUI uses a REDIS_KEY_PREFIX (default open-webui) to namespace Redis keys, allowing multiple instances to safely share a single Redis backend. Every Redis key in the codebase uses this prefix — except the tool_servers and terminal_servers keys in utils/tools.py, which use bare key names.

When two or more Open WebUI instances share a Redis database (a supported and documented deployment pattern, e.g., for multi-region deployments, blue-green setups, or cluster topologies), the unprefixed keys collide. An admin on Instance A writing to tool_servers overwrites the value read by Instance B — causing Instance B's users to receive Instance A's tool server configuration.

# utils/tools.py — unprefixed keys (problem)
await request.app.state.redis.set('tool_servers', ...)        # line 841
json.loads(await request.app.state.redis.get('tool_servers')) # line 850
await request.app.state.redis.set('terminal_servers', ...)    # line 976
json.loads(await request.app.state.redis.get('terminal_servers'))  # line 986

# Every other Redis key in the codebase — prefixed (correct pattern)
f'{REDIS_KEY_PREFIX}:auth:token:{jti}:revoked'
f'{REDIS_KEY_PREFIX}:ratelimit:{email}:{bucket}'
f'{REDIS_KEY_PREFIX}:tasks:commands'

Attack Scenario

Two Open WebUI instances (A and B) share a Redis backend — a supported deployment for multi-region setups, blue-green deployments, or hot-standby. Both instances have their own admin accounts; the shared Redis was chosen for coordinated session handling, rate limiting, and task management.

The same cross-instance poisoning applies to terminal_servers.

Impact

Preconditions

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.