Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-54007
Open WebUI: Cross-origin postMessage confirmation bypass via action:submit
- Class
- AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the source)
- Technique
- Cross-site request forgery
- Also involves
- Direct Prompt Injection
- Affected
- open-webui (PyPI)
- Gets past
- Approval or confirmation prompt
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
The chat page message listener accepts prompt and submit messages from any origin, so an external page can submit prompts and trigger model requests without the confirmation dialog. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Summary
The chat message listener allows non-same-origin input:prompt and action:submit messages, so an external site can set prompt text and trigger submitPrompt() in an authenticated victim session. I validated this with a cross-origin attacker page that auto-posted messages and caused unauthorized POST /api/v1/chats/new and POST /api/chat/completions requests containing attacker-controlled prompts. This enables cross-site forced actions and model/tool execution under victim privileges without consent.
Details
The chat page's window message listener in src/lib/components/chat/Chat.svelte processes message types including input:prompt and action:submit without adequately enforcing same-origin restrictions. Based on code around lines ~597-616, input text is set directly from event.data.text; action:submit proceeds to submitPrompt() on the current prompt. The logic does not apply a strict origin allowlist and permits non-same-origin control of the chat input and submission flow, leading to cross-origin command execution in the victim's authenticated UI context. As a result, backend API calls (e.g., POST /api/v1/chats/new, POST /api/chat/completions) are sent under victim credentials.
Normally, via the input:prompt:submit postMessage type, this results in a "Confirm Prompt from Embed" confirmation dialog:
https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/9bd84258d09eefe7bf975878fb0e31a5dadfe0f8/src/lib/components/chat/Chat.svelte#L604-L622
However, combining the two other types, it is possible to achieve the same effect without this confirmation:
https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/9bd84258d09eefe7bf975878fb0e31a5dadfe0f8/src/lib/components/chat/Chat.svelte#L584-L602
PoC
- Set up a local Open WebUI instance and log in to it, making sure a model is configured
- Host the following HTML anywhere and visit it (optionally change http://127.0.0.1:14000 to your instance Base URL):
<h1>Click anywhere</h1>
<script>
function sleep(ms) {
return new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, ms));
}
onclick = async () => {
w = window.open('http://127.0.0.1:14000');
await sleep(2000);
w.postMessage({ type: 'input:prompt', text: "INJECTED PROMPT" }, '*');
await sleep(500);
w.postMessage({ type: 'action:submit' }, '*');
}
</script>
- Click anywhere on the page, then notice without further interaction the "INJECTED PROMPT" is executed on the Open WebUI instance
<img width="874" height="264" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/244d9015-0dbf-47e0-a30e-1c2fbbde5e58" />
Impact
Conditions required: The victim must be authenticated to Open WebUI in the browser (token cookie present).
This issue enables cross-site forced actions under the victim's identity. An attacker can silently inject prompts and trigger model/tool execution (e.g., code interpreter, web search, retrieval, terminal/tool servers) as the victim without confirmation.
Original Agent Report
<img width="400" alt="app aikido dev_ai-pentests_projects_116389_assessments_019d67d4-81c8-7dd2-bb9e-0a4a774b2c78_issues_sidebarIssue=20439940 (4)" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7b6521ed-d08b-446d-a918-103523d08a1e" />
References
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-3vv5-8xxp-4f55
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54007
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3vv5-8xxp-4f55
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/open-webui/PYSEC-2026-2695.yaml
- https://pypi.org/project/open-webui
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.