Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-44551
Open WebUI has an LDAP Empty Password Authentication Bypass
- Class
- AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the source)
- Technique
- Authentication and access control
- Affected
- open-webui (PyPI)
- Gets past
- Authentication check
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- EPSS
- 1.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
An LDAP login with an empty password succeeds on servers that accept unauthenticated simple bind, issuing a session for the target user. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
LDAP Empty Password Authentication Bypass
Affected Component
LDAP authentication endpoint:
- backend/open_webui/routers/auths.py (lines 468-477, user bind with empty password)
- backend/open_webui/models/auths.py (lines 58-60, LdapForm model)
Affected Versions
Current main branch (commit 6fdd19bf1) and likely all versions with LDAP authentication support.
Description
The LDAP authentication endpoint does not validate that the submitted password is non-empty before performing a Simple Bind against the LDAP server. Per RFC 4513 Section 5.1.2, a Simple Bind with a valid DN and an empty password constitutes an "unauthenticated simple authentication" — many LDAP servers (including OpenLDAP in default configuration and some Active Directory setups) return success (resultCode 0) for this operation.
The LdapForm Pydantic model accepts password: str with no minimum length constraint, so an empty string passes validation. The subsequent Connection.bind() call succeeds on vulnerable LDAP servers, and the application issues a full session token for the target user.
# models/auths.py:58-60 — no min_length on password
class LdapForm(BaseModel):
user: str
password: str
# auths.py:469-477 — empty password reaches LDAP bind
connection_user = Connection(
server,
user_dn,
form_data.password, # can be ""
auto_bind='NONE',
authentication='SIMPLE',
)
if not await asyncio.to_thread(connection_user.bind):
raise HTTPException(400, 'Authentication failed.')
# If bind succeeds (which it does with empty password on many servers),
# execution continues and a full session token is issued
CVSS 3.1 Breakdown
| Metric | Value | Rationale |
|--------|-------|-----------|
| Attack Vector | Network (N) | Exploited remotely via the LDAP login endpoint |
| Attack Complexity | Low (L) | Single request with an empty password field |
| Privileges Required | None (N) | No prior authentication needed |
| User Interaction | None (N) | No victim interaction required |
| Scope | Unchanged (U) | Impact within the application's authentication boundary |
| Confidentiality | High (H) | Full access to victim's account data — chats, files, API keys, settings |
| Integrity | High (H) | Can modify victim's data, settings, send messages as victim |
| Availability | None (N) | No direct denial of service |
Attack Scenario
- LDAP authentication is enabled on the Open WebUI instance.
- The underlying LDAP server accepts unauthenticated simple binds (OpenLDAP default, some AD configs).
- Attacker sends: