Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-12372
NLTK network URL validation permits SSRF to RFC 6598 shared-address-space hosts
- Class
- AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Server-side request forgery
- Affected
- nltk (PyPI)
- Gets past
- SSRF protection
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
The private-address check misses the RFC 6598 shared range, so URLs pointing there pass validation and are fetched by the server. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in nltk/nltk versions 3.9.4 and the current develop branch. The nltk.pathsec.validate_network_url() function, intended to prevent SSRF by rejecting internal network addresses, fails to reject IPs in the RFC 6598 shared address space (100.64.0.0/10). This occurs because Python's ipaddress module does not classify such addresses as is_private or is_global, and the current guard only checks is_private and a few explicit categories. An attacker who can influence a URL passed to NLTK's network-loading helpers can exploit this vulnerability to make a strict-mode application send requests to shared-address-space hosts, potentially exposing non-public infrastructure reachable from the application host. The impact is limited to SSRF-style confidentiality exposure, with no code execution claimed.
References
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12372
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/4a820afa58810cd05049b6c6eae306694d6cfe65
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/releases/tag/v3.10.0
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nltk/PYSEC-2026-3955.yaml
- https://huntr.com/bounties/2911b643-571c-42e4-b0c2-9a1fa6f491db
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.