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New API is vulnerable to CSRF through user email binding

CVE-2026-44342 ยท 2026-07-07 moderate

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Cross-site request forgery
Affected
github.com/QuantumNous/new-api (Go)
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

Account binding actions use GET requests, so a cross-site navigation can make a logged-in user's browser bind attacker-controlled email or OAuth identities. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

The email and WeChat account binding endpoints used GET requests for state-changing account operations. In deployments where session cookies could be sent on cross-site navigations, an attacker could trigger a logged-in user's browser to bind an attacker-controlled email address or OAuth identity.

Affected endpoints included:

Impact

A successful attack could change account binding state. For email binding, the attacker could bind an email address they control and then attempt follow-on account recovery flows. The default session cookie configuration uses SameSite=Strict, which mitigates common cross-site navigation attacks in modern browsers, so the issue is rated Medium.

Affected versions

Versions before v0.12.0-alpha.1 are affected.

Patches

This issue is fixed in v0.12.0-alpha.1. The fix changes email and WeChat binding routes from GET to POST and reads parameters from a JSON request body instead of query parameters. The same change set also normalizes password reset responses to avoid disclosing whether an email is registered.

Workarounds

If upgrading immediately is not possible, ensure session cookies are configured with strict SameSite behavior and block GET requests to /api/oauth/email/bind and /api/oauth/wechat/bind at the reverse proxy.

Resources

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.