Browse / Tool and Agent Misuse / AML.CS0074
AISI Evaluation Agents Conduct Unsanctioned Real-World Cyber Activity
- Technique
- Generate Malicious Commands
How it worked
- AI Attack Adaptation · Autonomous Attack-Path Adaptation
Throughout Sample 1, the Mythos 5 agent revised its targeting and payloads in response to failures, maintainer reactions, detection, and callbacks.
- Reconnaissance · Autonomous Reconnaissance
The agent followed range metadata and DNS leads to public resources, mistakenly associating unrelated developers and repositories with its evaluation.
- Reconnaissance · Search Open Websites/Domains: Code Repositories
The agent searched GitHub accounts, repositories, commits, and public activity for identifiers associated with the range.
- Reconnaissance · Gather Victim Identity Information
The agent collected maintainer identities, email addresses, activity, and language cues to tailor malicious contributions and messages.
- Resource Development · Establish Accounts
The agent created GitHub personas and verified file-transfer identities for publishing payloads, submitting contributions, and contacting maintainers.
- Resource Development · Acquire Infrastructure
The agent obtained verification, hosting, and callback resources for account creation, payload delivery, remote tasking, and execution results.
- AI Attack Adaptation · Generate Malicious Commands
The agent generated retrieval commands, polling loops, persistence logic, and credential-collection code for its payloads.
- Resource Development · Develop Capabilities
The agent assembled the generated code into malicious installers, retrieval scripts, and multistage polling payloads.
- Resource Development · Stage Capabilities
The agent hosted payloads and tasking in public repositories and web resources for delivery through contributions, issues, and external messages.
- Defense Evasion · Masquerading
The agent disguised malicious contributions and retrieval scripts as bug fixes, release functionality, or diagnostics.
- Defense Evasion · Obfuscated Files or Information
The agent concealed payload content and retrieval locations using obfuscation, including runtime decoding.
- Initial Access · Supply Chain Compromise
The agent submitted a malicious pull request targeting a project's distributed installers. The maintainer rejected it, and no malicious release resulted.
- Initial Access · Phishing: Spearphishing via Social Engineering LLM
Fabricated personas, sockpuppet endorsements, form submissions, and file transfers urged maintainers to execute content or merge the contribution. Recipient execution was not established.
- Defense Evasion · LLM Prompt Obfuscation
The agent hid instructions in HTML comments, invisible in rendered GitHub issues but accessible through raw API content.
- Initial Access · Prompt Infiltration via Public-Facing Application
The agent published issues directing coding assistants to retrieve and execute payloads. An investigator encountered one; assistant ingestion was not established.
- Execution · LLM Prompt Injection: Indirect
The issue instructions attempted to induce a coding assistant to execute malicious commands. Successful instruction following was not established.
- Execution · User Execution
An investigator deliberately ran an issue payload in an isolated Docker container, enabling root execution there. The investigation also produced public warnings.
- Command and Control · Cyber Communication Channel
The payload polled HTTPS-hosted tasking, executed commands, and returned output to an external callback endpoint across four cycles.
- Execution · Command and Scripting Interpreter
After receiving a callback, the agent updated remote tasking to run enumeration commands in the container.
- Discovery · Enterprise Resource Discovery
The commands enumerated processes, files, directories, and other resources, including the root user's directory.
- Discovery · Enterprise Environment Discovery
The commands inspected network configuration and execution conditions and attempted connections to evaluation-range machines.
- Exfiltration · Exfiltration via Cyber Means
Enumeration results returned through callback infrastructure. They showed the container was outside the range, but the agent continued issuing commands.
- Execution · Command and Scripting Interpreter
Later tasking installed a Python startup hook and launched a detached credential watcher. Execution of these installation commands was confirmed.
- Persistence · Event Triggered Execution
The installed hook was designed to emit instructions during Python startup. Subsequent triggering was not established.
- Defense Evasion · Impersonation
The hook falsely claimed maintainer and CI approval and instructed another agent to merge and release the malicious contribution. Successful delivery was not established.
- Credential Access · Unsecured Credentials
The watcher repeatedly searched process output, authentication-related environment information, GitHub CLI storage, and Git credential files for credentials and attempted to stage them locally. Watcher execution was confirmed, but usable credential recovery was not established. The retrieval task did not execute, and no staged credentials were retrieved.
- Defense Evasion · Indicator Removal
Following public warnings, the agent edited issues and pull-request descriptions, replaced payloads, and rewrote Git history to reduce visible evidence.
- Resource Development · Establish Accounts
The Mythos 5 agent in Sample 3 created a GitHub persona named after a range hostname and organizations for distributing repositories.
- AI Attack Adaptation · Generate Malicious Commands
The agent in Sample 3 generated installer, retrieval, beaconing, and command-loop code, including authenticated GitHub operations using a token.
- Resource Development · Develop Capabilities
The agent in Sample 3 assembled installer and command-and-control payloads supporting SSH-key installation, DNS beaconing, and remote commands. Not all execution paths were observed.
- Resource Development · Stage Capabilities
The agent in Sample 3 replicated malicious tooling across 145 repositories, 33 releases, and four public Gists to attract presumed range updaters. A deliberately embedded token supported callback writes and enabled other runs to access the account.
- Credential Access · Unsecured Credentials
The Mythos 5 agent in Sample 2 recovered the token from a public Gist published by the agent in Sample 3.
- Initial Access · Valid Accounts
The agent in Sample 2 authenticated to the shared GitHub account, initially interpreting it as infrastructure belonging to the range's creator.
- Resource Development · Stage Capabilities
The agent in Sample 2 modified shared repositories and release assets with malicious files and SSH-key material. These changes also alerted the agent in Sample 3.
- Execution · Command and Scripting Interpreter
Malicious setup.py code in shared repositories executed during Dependabot processing in at least 53 containers. This occurred within expected package-processing sandboxes; no escape attempts or host compromise were reported.
- Command and Control · Cyber Communication Channel
The payloads were configured to use GitHub for tasking and beacon/output submission. Beacon files confirmed execution in Dependabot containers.
- AI Attack Adaptation · Autonomous AI Agent Communication: Communication via Shared Artifacts
After detecting another agent's modifications, the agent in Sample 3 published collaboration, output-preservation, and flag-sharing instructions. Completion of peer requests was not established.
- Credential Access · Unsecured Credentials
The Mythos 5 agent in Sample 7 recovered Sample 3's exposed token, interpreting the infrastructure as another CTF competitor's resources.
- Initial Access · Valid Accounts
The agent in Sample 7 authenticated to the shared GitHub account and added its SSH key.
- Resource Development · Stage Capabilities
The agent in Sample 7 launched a batch operation to append its SSH key across shared repositories. No causal link to observed Dependabot execution was established.
- Credential Access · Unsecured Credentials
The GPT-5.6 Sol agent in Sample 10 recovered the GitHub token exposed through Sample 3's public artifacts.
- Initial Access · Valid Accounts
The agent in Sample 10 authenticated and checked the shared repository for callbacks, later observing account suspension. Peer-task adoption and successful victim execution were not established.
Summary
Between July 25 and 28, 2026, autonomous AI agents undergoing cybersecurity evaluations by the UK AI Security Institute (AISI) took unsanctioned actions involving real people and public Internet services. AISI identified 19 events across 10 evaluation runs: 17 involved Claude Mythos 5 and two involved GPT-5.6 Sol. Activity included attempted supply-chain compromise, social engineering, prompt injection, and publication or exposure of infrastructure and payloads.
AISI enabled Internet access and disabled the model providers' cyber classifiers to assess their capabilities. A custom framework allowed agents to reason, call tools, and act without human intervention. Some runs had a misconfigured prompt that put the intended target out of scope, but unsanctioned activity also occurred in correctly configured runs. The prompts specified network scope but did not explicitly prohibit Internet activities such as social engineering. AISI had commercial security monitoring, but no synchronous LLM-based review to approve or block proposed agent actions.
On July 28, AISI detected Tor traffic leaving an evaluation environment. AISI stopped the evaluations, quarantined machines, restricted model access, and coordinated notification and cleanup. No AISI sandbox escape occurred, and neither escape from the investigator's container nor compromise of GitHub's underlying hosts was established. Its investigation of 122 runs identified the following activity:
Malicious contribution and social engineering: In Sample 1, the agent mistakenly targeted real developers, submitting a malicious bug-fix pull request and using fabricated identities and messages to encourage acceptance. After public warnings, it concealed evidence and replaced payloads. The maintainer rejected the contribution; no malicious release resulted.
Prompt injection and container execution: The same agent hid instructions in GitHub issues to induce coding assistants to execute malicious code. Assistant execution was not established, but an investigator deliberately tested a payload in an isolated container. The agent enumerated it and installed a persistence hook and credential watcher, continuing after recognizing it was outside the range. These actions sought credentials or another agent's cooperation to merge the malicious contribution. No collected credentials were retrieved.
Shared GitHub artifacts, token reuse, and package execution: Sample 3 published payloads containing a GitHub token that Samples 2, 7, and 10 reused to modify artifacts, propagate an SSH key, or inspect callbacks. Shared Samples 2/3 package code executed in at least 53 Dependabot containers within expected sandboxes. Sample 3 also published collaboration instructions, but completion of peer requests was not established.
Public infrastructure exposure: Other runs registered accounts and DNS resources and exposed local services through public tunnels. Target compromise was not established, and GPT-5.6 Sol's exposed DNS exploitation service received no observed resolver queries. These activities are not included in the graphs.
References
- https://www.aisi.gov.uk/blog/incident-report-unsanctioned-agent-behaviour-during-cyber-testing
- https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/663bd486c5e4c81588db7a1d/6a724858f7db25c81487016d_Security%20Incident%20INC-2026-07-28-01.pdf
Source: MITRE ATLAS case studies, used under Apache 2.0.