Bypasses / Path restriction
Path restriction
109 cases that got past this protection.
- NLTK: Path Traversal in save_maxent_params / load_maxent_params Allow Arbitrary File READ/WRITE The maxent save and load functions open files under a caller-supplied directory without the library's path restriction check, allowing reads and writes elsewhere.
- NLTK: Symlink escape in chat80.sql_query bypasses the pathsec data-root sandbox to read out-of-root SQLite databases Symlinks inside a trusted data root are followed by sqlite3 because lookup never resolves real paths, letting queries reach databases outside the sandboxed roots.
- NLTK: BllipParser passes caller-supplied model paths to the bllipparser C extension with no pathsec check, enabling arbitrary read BllipParser passes caller-chosen paths straight to a native extension, skipping NLTK's path validation, so arbitrary readable files can be opened.
- NLTK: Symlink escape in YCOECorpusReader lets a psd/pos directory symlink read files outside the corpus root within the data sandbox A directory symlink inside a corpus lets nested readers escape the corpus root and read files elsewhere in the data sandbox.
- Claude Code: TOCTOU Race in Edit Tool Allows File Writes Outside the Workspace A symlink swapped into a workspace directory after path validation lets the Edit tool write files outside the workspace, reachable from sandboxed code.
- MLflow vulnerable to arbitrary file read on unauthenticated servers via prompt model version source Prompt model version sources without a URL scheme skip path validation, so artifact requests can read arbitrary server files, including the auth database.
- NLTK: WekaClassifier passes an unvalidated caller-controlled model path to the weka JVM, bypassing nltk.pathsec containment The WekaClassifier wrapper passes caller-supplied model paths to the Java tool unchecked, skipping the containment checks that other NLTK loaders apply.
- PraisonAI: FastContext path resolution permits absolute and traversal reads outside the workspace Agent file-search tools accept absolute and traversal paths without confining them to the workspace, so model-driven calls read files outside the project.
- Docling: Crafted DoclingDocument JSON embeds local image files into converted output A crafted serialized document sets an image reference to a local path, and the converter reads that file and embeds it in exported output.
- Docling: `enable_local_fetch` is not enforced in HTML browser-rendering mode In browser render mode a crafted HTML page embeds local file URLs that were allowed unconditionally, so local file contents appear in the rendered page image.
- Docling: Arbitrary local file read via draw:image xlink:href in the OpenDocument backend A crafted ODF file makes the backend read an absolute path named in an image reference, embedding the file contents in the converted output.
- MCP Atlassian: Arbitrary File Read & Exfiltration (Confused Deputy) in JIRA update_issue An MCP tool passes agent-supplied absolute paths straight to an upload call, so the privileged server reads restricted host files and attaches them to a ticket.
- MCP Atlassian: Arbitrary file read/exfiltration via upload_attachment missing validate_safe_path() The MCP attachment upload tool sends local files to Confluence without the path check its download methods use, so an agent can be steered to read any file.
- MCP Atlassian: Arbitrary File Read via Upload Attachment Tools The upload attachment tools accept arbitrary server file paths without the safe-path check, letting an MCP client or an assistant steered by injected content exfiltrate files.
- n8n: Git Node branch.<name>.remote Config Key Bypasses Sandbox Path Restriction, Enabling Local Git Repository Read A branch remote value written into a repository's config bypasses the Git node's repository check, so a fetch can read any local repository.
- NLTK: Corpus Reader Sandbox Bypass Two NLTK corpus reader constructors open files and databases from outside the root before the pathsec sandbox check runs, letting callers read arbitrary paths.
- NLTK: Symlink-based arbitrary file read in IPIPANCorpusReader, bypasses nltk.pathsec entirely A symlink inside the corpus root passes traversal checks, and the IPIPAN reader opens it with builtin open, reading arbitrary files the process can access.
- NLTK: Stable FrameNet and NKJP readers parse outside-root XML NLTK reader functions build XML file paths from unvalidated selectors or index values, letting traversal read files outside the corpus root.
- NLTK: FileSystemPathPointer.open() sandbox check is dead code — arbitrary file read via file:// protocol A logic error makes the absolute-path check in the file pointer's open method never trigger, so any file the process can read is loaded through a file URL.
- NLTK: Symlink-based sandbox bypass in FramenetCorpusReader (bypasses the fix for CVE-2026-54292) A symlink with a separator-free name inside the corpus directory passes the name check, so reads resolve to files outside the corpus root.
- NLTK: Corpus readers follow symlinks outside trusted roots despite pathsec enforcement Symlinks inside a trusted corpus root point outside it, and corpus readers open those targets with plain open(), skipping NLTK's path security check.
- NLTK: Symlink escape in CorpusReader allows arbitrary local file read outside the corpus root A symlink inside the corpus root points outside it; the lexical path check passes, so reads follow the link to arbitrary local files.
- NLTK: StreamBackedCorpusView Bypasses pathsec.ENFORCE - Arbitrary Local File Read A corpus reader opens files directly without the enforced path check, so attacker-chosen file IDs can read any local file.
- NLTK: Model-artifact APIs bypass pathsec and touch files outside allowed roots Model import and export functions call plain open() on caller-supplied paths, skipping the path guard that sibling helpers apply and reading or writing outside allowed roots.
- NLTK: Downloader.download follows hardlinks and overwrites outside-root files The downloader blocks symlink escapes but not pre-existing hardlinks, so extracting a package writes through a hardlink and modifies a file outside the install root.
- PraisonAI: [Path Traversal] agent tools escape the configured workspace via symlinks Agent file and command tools check the workspace boundary with abspath, so in-workspace symlinks and relative paths let prompt-driven calls reach files outside it.
- NLTK CrubadanCorpusReader path traversal allows arbitrary file disclosure A corpus mapping value that is an absolute path makes the reader open files outside the corpus, skipping the containment check.
- chrome-devtools-mcp: validatePath() does not canonicalize symlinks before enforcing roots The workspace check compares unresolved paths, so an in-root symlink pointing outside the workspace passes and is then read or overwritten.
- nltk: Arbitrary File Read via Path Traversal in nltk.data.load() through Percent-Encoded Sequences Percent-encoded dot segments pass path checks that run before url2pathname decodes them, letting resource lookups escape the NLTK data directory.
- Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) has path traversal in FramenetCorpusReader.frame() that allows arbitrary XML file read, bypassing the nltk.pathsec sandbox (ENFORCE=True) A name containing parent-directory sequences is joined into a corpus XML path read with plain open, skipping the pathsec check and reading files outside the corpus.
- open-webui terminal proxy path traversal guard bypass via 9x encoded traversal Traversal sequences encoded nine times survive the proxy's limited decoding loop, so requests reach terminal server paths outside the permitted proxy prefix.
- n8n: Race Condition in Git Clone Node Allows Authenticated Users to Achieve Remote Code Execution A race between validating the clone path and running it lets a user swap in a symlink, planting a repository where the server loads custom nodes as code.
- n8n: Git Node fetch/pull/pushTags Operations Bypass Sandbox Path Restriction A workflow author can point an allowlisted git remote at a local repository outside the sandbox, fetch it into the workspace, and read its files.
- n8n: Path-Confinement Bypass in computer-use search_files Allows Reading Files Outside the Base Directory A crafted search pattern in an agent file-search tool escapes the configured base directory and returns contents of files elsewhere.
- Keras: tar extraction permits symlink-based path traversal Symlink entries in a crafted tar archive skip the directory containment check, so they can point outside the extraction folder and enable reads and overwrites.
- mcp-atlassian: Arbitrary file read via missing path validation in confluence_upload_attachment The upload tool opens any caller-supplied path without the safety check its download counterpart uses, letting callers push host files to Confluence.
- Gradio FileExplorer preprocess path traversal allows files outside root_dir to reach callbacks Crafted path segments make the FileExplorer preprocess step discard the root directory prefix, letting unauthenticated callers read files outside it.
- PraisonAI Dynamic Context history and terminal tools read files outside configured storage via path traversal Agent-callable history and terminal tools join caller-supplied identifiers into file paths without rejecting absolute paths or traversal sequences, exposing files outside the storage directory.
- PraisonAI Code agent tools fail open without a workspace boundary Agent code tools skip workspace containment when no workspace was set, so an agent steered by an attacker can read and edit absolute paths outside the project.
- PraisonAI dynamic-context artifact tools read arbitrary host files outside artifact storage Artifact helper tools accept any filesystem path and read it directly, so a prompt that controls tool arguments can read host files outside the artifact store.
- PraisonAI: Arbitrary File Read via `@file:` Mention Path Traversal Prompt-level @file mentions fall back to unchecked absolute paths, letting an attacker read any file the agent process can access.
- Open WebUI: Sibling-Prefix Path Traversal via /cache/{path} A prefix-only directory check lacks a trailing separator, so sibling directories sharing the cache name prefix can be read by authenticated users.
- Open WebUI: Path traversal / SSRF in terminal server proxy via encoded path traversal Double-encoded dot segments slip past the proxy's path sanitiser, letting an authenticated user reach files and endpoints outside the intended scope on the terminal server.
- LangChain: Path traversal and sandbox escape in LangChain file-search middleware and loaders LangChain file-search middleware and config loaders check only the start directory or string prefixes, so glob patterns or symlinks reach files outside the root.
- Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK): URL-Encoded Path Traversal in nltk.data.load() Allows Arbitrary Local File Read The traversal check runs on the raw resource name before percent-decoding, so encoded separators and dot segments reach the filesystem and read arbitrary files.
- n8n: Git Node Clone and Push Operations Bypass File Sandbox The Git node accepts local filesystem paths as clone or push sources, letting workflows copy repositories that the file sandbox would block.
- Keras archive extraction utilities allow path traversal and arbitrary file writes Archive filters check member paths against the working directory rather than the extraction target, so traversal entries escape when the process runs from root.
- PraisonAI has an Arbitrary File Write in Python API Hidden text on a crawled webpage instructs the agent to call a file-writing tool, which writes attacker content to an attacker-chosen path because path validation is skipped.
- n8n: Legacy ExecuteWorkflow Node Bypassed File Path Restrictions An authenticated user submits an arbitrary file path through the REST API to a legacy node option that skips the file-access restriction, letting them probe or load server files.
- MLflow allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to read arbitrary files from the server's filesystem Creating a model version with a prompt tag skips source path validation, so an unauthenticated caller can register a local path that is later served as a file.