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vLLM: Qwen2-VL / Qwen3-VL video samplers bound on request-controlled max_frames, which the num_frames ceiling does not reach

CVE-2026-105758 · 2026-10-05 moderate

Class
Unbounded Consumption (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Denial of service
Affected
vllm (PyPI)
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

Unauthenticated requests set uncapped frame and fps limits for Qwen vision models, inflating API server memory use. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

An unauthenticated remote attacker can exhaust the memory of the vLLM API-server process by raising the request-level media_io_kwargs.video.max_frames and fps knobs on any deployment serving a Qwen2-VL or Qwen3-VL model. 74 extra bytes of JSON took the server's peak RSS from 2 271 MiB to 13 629 MiB over unauthenticated POST /tokenize.

The num_frames ceiling reported in GHSA-vxqj-p4gw-9h4c and fixed by open PR #51969 does not reach this path: the Qwen samplers do not read num_frames at all. The same knobs were already capped upstream for GLMGAVideoBackend as an accepted security fix in 8b6de0eb9 (PR #54935, merged 2026-09-04); that cap never reached Qwen.

Details

Relationship to GHSA-vxqj-p4gw-9h4c and PR #51969 (read this first)

GHSA-vxqj-p4gw-9h4c reported that request-level media_io_kwargs.video.num_frames overrides the engine frame-count ceiling, and open PR #51969 fixes it by clamping num_frames inside VideoMediaIO.merge_kwargs.

That clamp does not reach the Qwen samplers. Qwen2VLVideoBackend and Qwen3VLVideoBackend do not read num_frames at all — Qwen2VLVideoBackend's own docstring says so ("`num_frames is ignored (fps-driven, like the Qwen3-VL loader)"). They bound on max_frames`, read from the same merged dict with no ceiling:

# vllm/multimodal/video.py — Qwen3VLVideoBackend.compute_frames_index_to_sample
min_frames = kwargs.get("min_frames", 4)
max_frames = kwargs.get("max_frames", 768)
num_frames = int(total_frames_num / original_fps * fps)
num_frames = min(max(num_frames, min_frames), max_frames, total_frames_num)

With max_frames raised from the request, the only remaining bound is total_frames_num — every frame in the container.

I applied PR #51969's patch locally and re-ran both paths through the real merge layer (merge_media_io_kwargs → VideoMediaIO.merge_kwargs → MediaConnector), against main @ b23433088:

| request media_io_kwargs.video | merged kwargs after #51969 | frames decoded | peak RSS |
|---|---|---|---|
| *(absent)* | None | 32 | 706 MiB |
| {"video_backend":"opencv","num_frames":-1} | {…,"num_frames":32} | 32 — fixed | 706 MiB |
| {"video_backend":"qwen3_vl"} | {…,"num_frames":32} | 60 | 779 MiB |
| {"video_backend":"qwen3_vl","max_frames":1e9,"fps":1e6} | {…,"max_frames":1000000000,"fps":1000000,"num_frames":32} | 900 — survives | 2 994 MiB |

#51969 does exactly what it claims for num_frames; the clamp writes num_frames: 32 into the merged dict and the Qwen sampler ignores it, while max_frames and fps pass through untouched.

The codebase already has the fix pattern, on other backends

This is not a new control being proposed. Commit 8b6de0eb9 — "[Security] Cap GLMGA video sampling to prevent request-driven resource exhaustion" (PR #54935, merged 2026-09-04, same author as #51969) — caps precisely these two knobs for GLMGAVideoBackend:

_MAX_FRAMES: ClassVar[int] = 640
_MAX_FPS: ClassVar[int] = 30
...
target_fps = min(target.fps, cls._MAX_FPS)
max_frames = min(kwargs.get("max_frames", cls._MAX_FRAMES), cls._MAX_FRAMES)

Its description states the root cause as "both target_fps and max_frames are controllable via request-level media_io_kwargs", and says it follows "the pattern established by GLM46VVideoBackend" (which caps via _MAX_FRAME_COUNT_DYNAMIC = 640 and _MAX_DURATION = 2400).

So two backends cap request-controlled fps/max_frames as an accepted security measure. Qwen2VLVideoBackend and Qwen3VLVideoBackend — the most widely deployed video models on vLLM — cap neither. In GLMGA the uncapped knobs sized an intermediate *index list*; in the Qwen samplers they size the *decoded frame buffer*, which is larger by the per-frame pixel count.

Reachability — default configuration, no authentication

The Rust frontend is not affected. rust/src/server/src/routes/openai/chat_completions/validate.rs:90 rejects media_io_kwargs with "media_io_kwargs is not supported." No second front is needed.

Impact

Unauthenticated remote denial of service by memory exhaustion of the API-server process. The decode runs in the frontend during chat parsing, before scheduling or admission control, so every tenant on the instance is affected. --limit-mm-per-prompt does not apply — it bounds media *items*, not frames within an item. CWE-770 / CWE-400.

Measured over unauthenticated HTTP: 1.43 MiB request body, 74 extra bytes of JSON, server peak RSS 2 271 → 13 629 MiB. In-process, the same request takes the decode from 60 to 900 frames. The frame count is bounded only by total_frames_num, which is the attacker's choice of video, and decoded bytes are frames × H × W × 3.

Context, measured on the num_frames path (GHSA-vxqj-p4gw-9h4c's path), not this one — these figures show what an unbounded frame count costs once the source video is chosen for it, and they transfer to this path because both converge on the same _read_frames_no_recovery allocation:

The two were not re-run at the larger sizes through the Qwen sampler; the 900-frame figure above is what I measured on this path.

Suggested fix

Extend the ceiling to the sampler-side knobs rather than clamping the single num_frames key. Two options, either acceptable:

Option 2 composes with #51969 and needs no per-backend audit; I would favour it, but option 1 is the more conservative change and matches what has already been merged.

Affected versions

>= 0.24.0, through v0.29.1rc0 and main @ b23433088.

Lower bound established by probing release tags through the GitHub contents API; no version below is inferred, each was read out of the file at that tag.

Confirmed present — Qwen samplers reading unclamped max_frames (max_frames = kwargs.get("max_frames", 768) inside Qwen2VLVideoBackend / Qwen3VLVideoBackend in vllm/multimodal/video.py):

| ref | Qwen3VLVideoBackend present | unclamped max_frames |
|---|---|---|
| v0.23.0 | no (class does not exist) | n/a |
| v0.24.0 | yes | yes |
| v0.25.0, v0.26.0, v0.27.0, v0.28.0, v0.29.0, v0.29.1rc0 | yes | yes |
| main @ b23433088 | yes | yes |

Confirmed present — request-level media_io_kwargs (field on the chat request model, and VideoMediaIO.merge_kwargs present): every ref probed, v0.19.0 through v0.29.1rc0 and main @ b23433088.

Confirmed absent — any num_frames ceiling clamp (PR #51969 unmerged): every ref probed, v0.19.0 through v0.29.1rc0 and main @ b23433088.

Not resolved, and why:

No dependency versions are asserted anywhere in this report.

Weaknesses of this report, stated upfront

---

*Prepared with AI assistance (Claude), per the repository's contributing guidance on disclosing AI-assisted contributions. All findings were verified by executing vLLM's own code at the commits cited; the analysis and the claims are my own.*

*Reported by Eva Crystal / 0xiviel (XSource Security).*

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.