Browse / MCP and Tool Server Flaws / CVE-2025-66404
mcp-server-kubernetes has potential security issue in exec_in_pod tool
- Class
- MCP and Tool Server Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Code and command execution
- Also involves
- Indirect Prompt Injection
- Affected
- mcp-server-kubernetes (npm)
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- 1.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
String commands given to exec_in_pod are run through a shell without validation, so metacharacters inject extra commands into the pod. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Summary
A security issue exists in the exec_in_pod tool of the mcp-server-kubernetes MCP Server. The tool accepts user-provided commands in both array and string formats. When a string format is provided, it is passed directly to shell interpretation (sh -c) without input validation, allowing shell metacharacters to be interpreted. This vulnerability can be exploited through direct command injection or indirect prompt injection attacks, where AI agents may execute commands without explicit user intent.
Details
The MCP Server exposes the exec_in_pod tool to execute commands inside Kubernetes pods. The tool supports both array and string command formats. The Kubernetes Exec API (via @kubernetes/client-node) accepts commands as an array of strings, which executes commands directly without shell interpretation. However, when a string format is provided, the code automatically wraps it in shell execution (sh -c), which interprets shell metacharacters without any input validation.
When string commands contain shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &&, |, >, <, $), they are interpreted by the shell rather than being passed as literal arguments, allowing command injection. This vulnerability can be exploited in two ways:
- Direct command injection: Users or attackers with access to the MCP server can directly inject malicious commands through the tool interface.
- Indirect prompt injection: Malicious instructions embedded in data (e.g., pod logs) can trick AI agents into executing commands without explicit user intent.
Code pattern
The following snippet illustrates the code pattern used in the exec_in_pod tool:
File: src/tools/exec_in_pod.ts
export async function execInPod(
k8sManager: KubernetesManager,
input: {
name: string;
namespace?: string;
command: string | string[]; // User-controlled input
container?: string;
shell?: string;
timeout?: number;
context?: string;
}
): Promise<{ content: { type: string; text: string }[] }> {
const namespace = input.namespace || "default";
let commandArr: string[];
if (Array.isArray(input.command)) {
commandArr = input.command;
} else {
// User input passed to shell
const shell = input.shell || "/bin/sh";
commandArr = [shell, "-c", input.command]; // Shell metacharacters are interpreted
}
// ... Kubernetes Exec API call ...
exec.exec(
namespace,
input.name,
input.container ?? "",
commandArr, // Executed inside pod via shell
stdoutStream,
stderrStream,
stdinStream,
true,
callback
);
}
When input.command is a string, the code automatically wraps it in a shell command (/bin/sh -c), which interprets shell metacharacters. There is no input validation to detect or block shell metacharacters, allowing arbitrary command execution through command chaining (e.g., id>/tmp/TEST && echo done).
PoC
### Direct command injection via MCP Inspector
This demonstrates command injection through direct tool invocation:
- Start a Kubernetes cluster (e.g., using minikube):