Browse / MCP and Tool Server Flaws / CVE-2026-24052
Claude Code has a Domain Validation Bypass which Allows Automatic Requests to Attacker-Controlled Domains
- Class
- MCP and Tool Server Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Data exfiltration
- Affected
- @anthropic-ai/claude-code (npm)
- Gets past
- Sandbox or allowlist
- CVSS
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
The WebFetch trusted-domain check used prefix matching, so attacker domains that begin with a trusted name were fetched automatically, enabling data leakage. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Claude Code contained insufficient URL validation in its trusted domain verification mechanism for WebFetch requests. The application used a startsWith() function to validate trusted domains (e.g., docs.python.org, modelcontextprotocol.io), this could have enabled attackers to register domains like modelcontextprotocol.io.example.com that would pass validation. This could enable automatic requests to attacker-controlled domains without user consent, potentially leading to data exfiltration.
Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.
Thank you to hackerone.com/47sid-praetorian for reporting this issue!
References
- https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/security/advisories/GHSA-vhw5-3g5m-8ggf
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24052
- https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.