Browse / Indirect Prompt Injection / CVE-2026-24887
Claude Code has a Command Injection in find Command Bypasses User Approval Prompt
- Class
- Indirect Prompt Injection (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Code and command execution
- Also involves
- Tool and Agent Misuse
- Affected
- @anthropic-ai/claude-code (npm)
- Gets past
- Approval or confirmation prompt
- CVSS
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- EPSS
- 0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
Untrusted text placed in the context window could steer Claude Code's find invocation past the user approval prompt, so attacker commands run. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Due to an error in command parsing, it was possible to bypass the Claude Code confirmation prompt to trigger execution of untrusted commands through the find command. Reliably exploiting this required the ability to add untrusted content into a Claude Code context window.
Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.
Claude Code thanks https://hackerone.com/alexbernier for reporting this issue!
References
- https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/security/advisories/GHSA-qgqw-h4xq-7w8w
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24887
- https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.