Browse / Unbounded Consumption / CVE-2026-73556
vLLM: ReDoS via structured_outputs.regex in the lm-format-enforcer backend (no compile timeout) — missed sibling of GHSA-rwxx-mrjm-wc2m
- Class
- Unbounded Consumption (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Denial of service
- Affected
- vllm (PyPI)
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
- EPSS
- 0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
A structured output request with a catastrophic regex is compiled without a timeout in the lm-format-enforcer backend, stalling the inference worker. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Summary
The fix for GHSA-rwxx-mrjm-wc2m ("ReDoS via structured_outputs.regex compiled without timeout") wrapped the regex compile in the xgrammar and outlines backends with compile_regex_with_timeout (and, for outlines, validate_regex_is_buildable). The lm-format-enforcer backend was left unguarded: it compiles the attacker-supplied regex with no timeout and no buildability check. A single request with a catastrophic regex hangs the structured-output compile step and stalls the engine worker (denial of service).
Affected code (HEAD d6d39c1)
vllm/v1/structured_output/backend_lm_format_enforcer.py:
- line 110: character_level_parser = lmformatenforcer.RegexParser(grammar_spec) — builds an interegular FSM from the attacker regex synchronously, no timeout.
- line 155: validate_structured_output_request_lm_format_enforcer returns immediately on if so_params.regex: — no validation.
Sibling backends that WERE patched by GHSA-rwxx:
- backend_xgrammar.py:92 → compile_regex_with_timeout(...).
- backend_outlines.py:65 → compile_regex_with_timeout(...) (plus validate_regex_is_buildable).
lm-format-enforcer uses the same interegular DFA-construction primitive the advisory cites for the outlines backend.
Reproduction (runtime-verified against the sink)
The sink lmformatenforcer.RegexParser(<regex>) was exercised directly (this is exactly what the backend calls):
baseline '[0-9]{3}' -> 0.0002 s
attacker '(a{1,300}){300}' -> DID NOT COMPLETE in 20 s (one core pegged at 100% in interegular FSM construction)
End-to-end: start vllm serve <model> --structured-outputs-config '{"backend":"lm-format-enforcer"}', then POST /v1/completions with {"structured_outputs":{"regex":"(a{1,300}){300}"}, ...}. The request never returns; because grammar compile runs in the engine's structured-output path, concurrent requests stall = worker-level DoS. The identical request against the outlines backend is bounded by compile_regex_with_timeout and returns a clean error.
Impact
Unauthenticated denial of service (vLLM ships with no authentication by default). One request pegs a CPU core and blocks the structured-output engine path.
Reachability precondition: the operator must have selected backend=lm-format-enforcer via --structured-outputs-config (the default is auto → xgrammar). This is the same opt-in tier as the outlines backend that GHSA-rwxx already covered.
Suggested remediation
Route the lm-format-enforcer regex compile (backend_lm_format_enforcer.py:110) through the same compile_regex_with_timeout guard already applied to the xgrammar and outlines backends, and reject un-buildable / oversized patterns in validate_structured_output_request_lm_format_enforcer.
References
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-48jh-3gj7-fg8v
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73556
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/47595
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/c9a788eedc412acceaa5112e0d44624b49841577
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/releases/tag/v0.26.0
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.