Products / ray
ray
11 records.
- Ray: Arbitrary code execution via ray.data.read_webdataset default decoder: pickle.loads(value) and torch.load(weights_only=False)
- Ray: Remote Code Execution via Parquet Arrow Extension Type Deserialization
- Ray Dashboard is vulnerable to path traversal through its static file handling mechanism
- Ray dashboard DELETE endpoints allow unauthenticated browser-triggered DoS (Serve shutdown / job deletion)
- Ray's New Token Authentication is Disabled By Default
- Ray is vulnerable to Critical RCE via Safari & Firefox Browsers through DNS Rebinding Attack
- ray vulnerable to Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File
- Ray has arbitrary code execution via jobs submission API The Ray job submission API lets a remote party run arbitrary code on the cluster, which the vendor says is only meant for controlled networks.
- Ray Path Traversal vulnerability The unauthenticated log API endpoint accepts file paths without restriction, letting callers read arbitrary files on the server.
- Ray Missing Authorization vulnerability The static file route accepts traversal sequences, letting unauthenticated requests read arbitrary files on the server.
- Ray OS Command Injection vulnerability