Products / litellm
litellm
44 records.
- LiteLLM: Privilege Escalation to Proxy Admin via Cross-Domain Reuse of the Salt Key Reusing one encryption key for both secret storage and session tokens lets an internal user forge an admin token via a crafted key metadata field.
- LiteLLM: internal_user_viewer arbitrary local file read via `vertex_ai_credentials`
- LiteLLM vulnerable to reflected XSS in /sso/debug/callback
- LiteLLM: Authenticated SSRF and provider-credential exfiltration via unvalidated request-body routing parameters A denylist on request-body routing fields misses nested or uncovered parameters, letting an authenticated user redirect provider calls and receive the proxy's stored credentials.
- LiteLLM Proxy has server-side request forgery via the `user_config` request parameter
- LiteLLM vulnerable to server-side template injection in the /prompts/test endpoint The prompt test endpoint renders attacker-supplied template text with an unsandboxed Jinja2 environment, letting unauthenticated callers run OS commands.
- LiteLLM: Local file read via request-supplied OIDC file references A health test endpoint resolves request-supplied OIDC file references, letting a privileged caller make the server read arbitrary local files.
- LiteLLM: Arbitrary file write via path traversal in Skills archive extraction Skill ZIP entries containing traversal sequences are written outside the staging directory when the skill is processed.
- LiteLLM: Custom Code Guardrails production endpoints bypass code safety checks Production create and update routes for custom guardrail code skip the sandbox used by the test endpoint, so submitted Python runs inside the proxy.
- LiteLLM: MCP Authentication Bypass via OAuth2 Passthrough Fallback An unauthenticated caller sends a fabricated Bearer token to the MCP endpoint, and a fallback path substitutes an empty auth object so the session is accepted.
- LiteLLM: MCP Proxy Has Improper Authentication A flaw in the MCP proxy's API key authentication lets a remote caller pass the check without valid credentials.
- LiteLLM: Admin Key Handler Has Improper Authorization A remote caller could reach a LiteLLM key management handler that fails to verify authorization, enabling administrative key operations.
- BerriAI litellm has SSRF via Unvalidated spec_path URL in MCP OpenAPI Spec Loader An attacker-supplied spec path makes the MCP OpenAPI loader fetch arbitrary URLs from the server without restricting the destination.
- LiteLLM: SSO Debug Flow Has Improper Authentication
- BerriAI litellm: UI User Enumeration leads to System-Wide Information Disclosure
- LiteLLM: PROXY_ADMIN database API Key Generator Has Insufficient Session Expiration
- BerriAI litellm has Security Feature Bypass in BannedKeywords and AzureContentSafety Guardrails via call_type Mismatch on Async Endpoints
- LiteLLM: M2M JWT Handler Has Improper Authorization
- BerriAI litellm: SSO Login Does Not Invalidate Previous UI Session Tokens
- LiteLLM: Authentication Bypass via Host Header Injection A crafted Host header makes the proxy's auth gate check a different route from the one served, skipping authentication on management endpoints.
- LiteLLM allows an authenticated internal_user to create API keys with access to routes that their role does not permit
- LiteLLM allows a user to modify their own user_role via the /user/update endpoint
- LiteLLM has a sandbox escape in custom-code guardrail
- LiteLLM: Authenticated command execution via MCP stdio test endpoints
- LiteLLM has SQL Injection in Proxy API key verification
- LiteLLM: Server-Side Template Injection in /prompts/test endpoint
- LiteLLM: Password hash exposure and pass-the-hash authentication bypass User endpoints return stored password hashes to any authenticated user, and login accepts that hash in place of the password, allowing account takeover.
- LiteLLM: Privilege escalation via unrestricted proxy configuration endpoint The config update route lacks an admin role check, so any logged-in user can change proxy settings, register code handlers and overwrite admin credentials.
- LiteLLM: Authentication bypass via OIDC userinfo cache key collision
- Two LiteLLM versions published containing credential harvesting malware Malicious releases were published to PyPI containing code that harvests credentials and files and sends them to a remote server.
- LiteLLM Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) A config value for a post-call callback is split into module and function names and imported, letting an attacker point it at os.system.
- LiteLLM Has a Leakage of Langfuse API Keys An error path while parsing team settings exposes the Langfuse secret and public keys in output.
- LiteLLM Vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) via Crafted HTTP Request
- LiteLLM Has an Improper Authorization Vulnerability
- LiteLLM Reveals Portion of API Key via a Logging File
- LiteLLM Vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS)
- LiteLLM Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability A user-supplied api_base on the chat completions route makes the server send requests to attacker hosts, carrying the stored OpenAI key with them.
- litellm vulnerable to remote code execution based on using eval unsafely
- litellm vulnerable to improper access control in team management
- Arbitrary file deletion in litellm The transcription endpoint deletes the path taken from the uploaded filename without validation, so callers can remove arbitrary files on the server.
- SQL injection in litellm The team update route places the user_id value directly into a raw SQL delete statement, letting attackers run blind queries to extract stored keys and tokens.
- SQL injection in litellm
- litellm passes untrusted data to `eval` function without sanitization Values written to environment variables through a config update reach an unsafe eval() call during secret retrieval with Google KMS, executing code.
- LiteLLM has Server-Side Template Injection vulnerability in /completions endpoint A malicious tokenizer_config.json supplies a chat_template that LiteLLM renders with Jinja unsafely, executing code on the server when the model is used.