Products / keras
keras
20 records.
- Keras model loading is vulnerable to denial of service through HDF5 shape bombs A specially crafted .keras archive declares oversized HDF5 datasets, so loading it allocates unbounded memory and the process is killed.
- Keras: HDF5 links can disclose local file contents
- Keras: TorchModuleWrapper can deserialize unsafe PyTorch pickle data
- Keras: tar extraction permits symlink-based path traversal
- Keras: Lambda deserialization can bypass safe mode and execute code
- Keras: HDF5 virtual datasets can disclose local files A malicious .keras or .h5 model file with virtual datasets pointing at local HDF5 files makes Keras read those files when the model is loaded, because the earlier fix missed this check.
- Keras: DiskIOStore permits path traversal through crafted layer names
- Keras archive extraction utilities allow path traversal and arbitrary file writes
- Keras vulnerable to DoS via Malicious .keras Model (HDF5 Shape Bomb Causes Petabyte Allocation in KerasFileEditor)
- Keras has an untrusted deserialization vulnerability A crafted .keras archive makes TFSMLayer load an attacker's SavedModel, running code even when safe_mode is enabled.
- Keras has a Local File Disclosure via HDF5 External Storage During Keras Weight Loading A malicious HDF5 weights file uses external storage links that load_weights follows, so contents of arbitrary host files are read into model tensors, bypassing safe mode.
- Keras Directory Traversal Vulnerability
- Keras is vulnerable to arbitrary local file loading and Server-Side Request Forgery
- Keras framework vulnerable to deserialization of untrusted data A crafted Keras file referencing a TorchModuleWrapper class runs attacker code while loading, even with safe mode enabled, whether the file is local or remote.
- Keras is vulnerable to Deserialization of Untrusted Data A crafted .keras archive re-enables unsafe deserialisation from inside its config before layer parsing, then a pickled Lambda layer runs attacker code when the model loads.
- The Keras `Model.load_model` method **silently** ignores `safe_mode=True` and allows arbitrary code execution when a `.h5`/`.hdf5` file is loaded. Loading an .h5 model ignores safe_mode=True, so pickled code inside the file runs on the victim's machine during load.
- Keras vulnerable to CVE-2025-1550 bypass via reuse of internal functionality Crafted arguments to built-in Keras modules let a malicious saved model trigger file overwrites during loading even with safe mode enabled.
- Arbitrary Code Execution via Crafted Keras Config for Model Loading A malicious .keras archive with an edited config.json names arbitrary modules and functions that run during load_model, even with safe mode on.
- keras Path Traversal vulnerability Extracting a crafted tar archive fetched by the file download helper writes files to paths outside the intended directory.
- Keras code injection vulnerability