Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws
AI Framework and Platform Flaws
Classic software bugs in the libraries and platforms that run AI: memory corruption, traversal, SSRF, auth. 1,542 records. Reference: CWE.
- Denial of service 377
- Authentication and access control 256
- Path traversal and file access 192
- Memory corruption 159
- Code and command execution 133
- Server-side request forgery 103
- Information exposure 78
- Sandbox escape 76
- Cross-site scripting 68
- Other weaknesses 46
- SQL and query injection 22
- Real-world incidents 10
- Cross-site request forgery 8
- Unsafe deserialisation 8
- Data exfiltration 6
- Open WebUI: Channel members can overwrite another member's message via the chat completions endpoint A channel member can rewrite another member's message through the chat completions path, which skips the authorship check that the dedicated edit route applies.
- Open WebUI: Same-origin XSS to account takeover via terminal port-preview iframe hardcoding allow-same-origin A terminal port preview iframe keeps same-origin access, so script served from a previewed port runs in the app origin and steals sessions.
- Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can suppress calendar alerts instance-wide via a non-numeric alert value A user stores a non-numeric alert value in calendar event metadata, which breaks the shared scheduler pass for every user.
- Open WebUI: Admin demoted through SSO role sync keeps read and write access to all users' notes Demoting a user through SSO role sync does not close their open Socket.IO connection, so cached admin rights keep working on all users' notes.
- Open WebUI: Sign-in as another user via wildcard characters in the OAuth subject claim on SQLite On SQLite, identity lookup uses substring matching, so a subject containing wildcard characters can sign in as another account, possibly an admin.
- Open WebUI: Users denied by the OAuth role policy can still sign in via token exchange Token exchange issues sessions without re-running role management, so users whose provider role was revoked keep their previous access level.
- n8n: Domain-Restriction Bypass via Unguarded Model-Search Endpoint in OpenAI Chat Model Node The model-search path skips the allowed-domains check, so a custom base URL sends the stored API credential to any host.
- n8n: Anonymous Approval-Gate Bypass via Reused resumeToken over the Chat WebSocket A reused resume token from a public form lets an anonymous party resume a paused workflow through the chat route, bypassing the approval gate that should hold it.
- n8n: GitHub Trigger 422 Reuse Path Skips Webhook Secret Storage, Causing Signature Verification to Fail-Open After a 422 reuse path the stored webhook signing secret is discarded, so signature verification accepts unsigned deliveries.
- n8n: Cross-User Active Workflow ID and Lifecycle Event Disclosure via Missing userId Filter n8n's active-workflows endpoint and push events skip the per-user sharing filter, so members can see workflow IDs and activity they should not access.
- n8n: Prototype Pollution via Workflow Structure Summary Can Lead to Denial of Service Posting a workflow with a reserved key such as __proto__ directly to the REST API pollutes Object.prototype, because the editor's client-side name check is skipped.
- n8n: Expression Sandbox Escape via Shared Builtin Tampering and Code-Printer Injection Leads to Code Execution Replacing the global JSON.stringify changes the source generated by the legacy expression engine at runtime, so a crafted expression escapes the sandbox and executes code.
- n8n: Cross-Tenant Project-Member PII Disclosure via Missing Per-Project Scope Check on Role Assignment Endpoints Role assignment endpoints check role permission but not project visibility, so a user can read members of any project by naming it.
- n8n: Per-Resource OAuth Consent Bypass via Unbound Refresh Token Resource Substitution Refresh requests were checked only for a registered resource, not against the resource in the original grant, so a token could be refreshed for a different protected workflow.
- n8n: Path Injection in Elasticsearch and ElasticSecurity Nodes via Unencoded Identifiers Identifiers are placed unencoded into REST paths, so separators or dot segments redirect requests to other Elasticsearch endpoints using the stored credential.
- n8n: Unauthenticated Persistent Storage Exhaustion via OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Endpoint Unauthenticated OAuth client registration requests accept unbounded client_name and grant_types values, which are stored until database storage grows without limit.
- n8n: Expression Sandbox Escape via Class-Field Sanitizer Rebinding Can Lead to Code Execution A class field named __sanitize rebinds the expression sanitizer's this, reaching the Function constructor and running arbitrary JavaScript in n8n.
- n8n: Regular Expression Denial of Service in the Default Blocked-File-Pattern Match via a Git Node Clone Path A crafted clone path causes catastrophic regex backtracking in a synchronous check, freezing the n8n process for all users.
- n8n: Disabled OIDC SSO Endpoints Remain Active and Issue Valid Sessions OIDC login and callback endpoints keep issuing sessions after the provider is disabled because they do not check whether OIDC is the active method.
- n8n: Log Streaming Event Destinations Decrypt Generic-Auth Credentials Without Ownership Check Log streaming destinations decrypt any referenced generic credential without checking the caller's access, so a user can send another project's secret to an endpoint they control.
- n8n: Git Node branch.<name>.remote Config Key Bypasses Sandbox Path Restriction, Enabling Local Git Repository Read A branch remote value written into a repository's config bypasses the Git node's repository check, so a fetch can read any local repository.
- Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can hang the server via message deletion in a cyclic chat tree A chat whose messages reference each other as children makes the message-deletion walk loop forever, blocking the server's event loop.
- Open WebUI: Server-side fetches reach blocked and internal hosts via unvalidated HTTP redirect targets Redirect targets from server-side page fetches skip the blocked-host and private-address checks, so authenticated users can reach internal services.
- Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can hang the server via a cyclic chat message history A chat history whose messages reference each other in a cycle without ids makes the server's walk loop forever, blocking all users.
- NLTK: Corpus Reader Sandbox Bypass Two NLTK corpus reader constructors open files and databases from outside the root before the pathsec sandbox check runs, letting callers read arbitrary paths.
- NLTK: Symlink-based arbitrary file read in IPIPANCorpusReader, bypasses nltk.pathsec entirely A symlink inside the corpus root passes traversal checks, and the IPIPAN reader opens it with builtin open, reading arbitrary files the process can access.
- NLTK: Stable FrameNet and NKJP readers parse outside-root XML NLTK reader functions build XML file paths from unvalidated selectors or index values, letting traversal read files outside the corpus root.
- NLTK: pathsec SSRF protection can be bypassed when a proxy is configured When a proxy is configured, the NLTK URL check validates the hostname but the fetch goes through the proxy, reaching internal services the check was meant to block.
- NLTK: FileSystemPathPointer.open() sandbox check is dead code — arbitrary file read via file:// protocol A logic error makes the absolute-path check in the file pointer's open method never trigger, so any file the process can read is loaded through a file URL.
- NLTK: Pl196xCorpusReader has quadratic ReDoS on malformed TEI blocks Lazy regexes over a TEI block rescan from each unmatched opening tag, so a malformed corpus file causes quadratic CPU growth in reader calls.
- NLTK: Entity-expansion DoS (billion laughs) via remaining raw ElementTree parses Entity-declaring XML handed to several NLTK parsers expands exponentially in memory, exhausting resources, because those call sites bypassed the safe XML parsing helper.
- NLTK: Symlink-based sandbox bypass in FramenetCorpusReader (bypasses the fix for CVE-2026-54292) A symlink with a separator-free name inside the corpus directory passes the name check, so reads resolve to files outside the corpus root.
- NLTK: Corpus readers follow symlinks outside trusted roots despite pathsec enforcement Symlinks inside a trusted corpus root point outside it, and corpus readers open those targets with plain open(), skipping NLTK's path security check.
- NLTK: Symlink escape in CorpusReader allows arbitrary local file read outside the corpus root A symlink inside the corpus root points outside it; the lexical path check passes, so reads follow the link to arbitrary local files.
- NLTK: ReDoS in nltk.text.Text.findall() via unvalidated user-supplied regular expressions User-supplied regular expressions passed to NLTK Text.findall run without timeout or validation, allowing catastrophic backtracking.
- NLTK: ReDoS in nltk.tgrep via unvalidated user-supplied regular expressions A user-supplied regular expression in the tgrep query path is compiled and run without limits, so a crafted pattern against a non-matching label causes exponential backtracking.
- NLTK: StreamBackedCorpusView Bypasses pathsec.ENFORCE - Arbitrary Local File Read A corpus reader opens files directly without the enforced path check, so attacker-chosen file IDs can read any local file.
- vLLM: SSRF + arbitrary local file read in MiMoV2OmniMultiModalProcessor `_fetch_image` and audio loader bypass MediaConnector protections A multimodal processor fetches user-supplied image and audio URLs and local paths directly, skipping the media connector's SSRF and local path checks.
- vLLM: Cross-User Data Leak Vulnerability An integer overflow in an activation kernel's index arithmetic makes some batched requests read and return another user's inference output.
- vLLM: Unauthenticated Internal Path and Username Disclosure via Validation Error Messages Malformed API requests trigger validation errors whose text includes server file paths, line numbers and handler names, which unauthenticated callers can read.
- vLLM: Incomplete CVE-2025-62164 remediation can be bypassed by concurrent prompt parts Two concurrent prompt-embedding parts race on a process-wide sparse-check flag, letting a malformed sparse tensor reach dense conversion unchecked.
- unstructured: Server-Side Request Forgery in the URL-based partitioning The URL loader fetches caller-supplied addresses without host checks and returns the response body, letting requests reach internal and metadata services.
- NLTK: SSRF Fail-Open in validate_network_url() via DNS Resolution Failure When DNS resolution fails, validate_network_url returns without rejecting the URL, so urlopen fetches internal targets such as cloud metadata endpoints.
- NLTK: Model-artifact APIs bypass pathsec and touch files outside allowed roots Model import and export functions call plain open() on caller-supplied paths, skipping the path guard that sibling helpers apply and reading or writing outside allowed roots.
- NLTK: Uncontrolled recursion in nltk.featstruct.FeatStructReader causes unhandled RecursionError (DoS) via deeply nested feature-structure input The featstruct parser recurses on nested brackets with no depth limit, so a short, deeply nested string exhausts the stack and raises an uncaught RecursionError.
- NLTK: Downloader.download follows hardlinks and overwrites outside-root files The downloader blocks symlink escapes but not pre-existing hardlinks, so extracting a package writes through a hardlink and modifies a file outside the install root.
- NLTK: Uncontrolled resource consumption in RecursiveDescentParser via ambiguous or left-recursive grammars The recursive descent parser explores parses without a bound, so crafted left-recursive or ambiguous grammars exhaust CPU and stack.
- NLTK: Default ENFORCE=False Disables All pathsec Security Controls The security checks added for earlier CVEs only log warnings by default, so path traversal, unsafe URLs and unsafe pickle loading still proceed.
- NLTK: Quadratic CPU Exhaustion in `XMLCorpusView._read_xml_fragment()` Each read loop iteration rescans the whole accumulated XML buffer, so a malformed corpus file makes parsing time grow quadratically and exhaust CPU.
- NLTK: Quadratic-time DoS in PorterStemmer via long runs of 'y' A long run of the letter y makes the stemmer's measure routine rescan backwards on every call, so stemming time grows quadratically with token length.